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This dissertation project investigates the relationship between legal sanctions and politics in
Brazil. In the first chapter, I look at the effect of judicial convictions for electoral crimes on electoral
performance in four municipal elections between 2004 and 2016. I find that voters respond to
criminal information disclosed by the judiciary and punish candidates more harshly when their
crimes are more severe. The second chapter tests whether state court judges significantly rule in
favor of politicians involved in small claims cases. The results show a negative bias against litigant
politicians, indicating that judges punish, rather than favor, politicians in court. Finally, the last
chapter verifies whether active and passive transparency simultaneously improve local governance in
Brazilian municipalities. I document a positive impact on human development index under active
and passive transparency, beyond what either would contribute if implemented in isolation.
However, there are no effects on government performance and sanctions imposed on public officials.
Besides answering these research questions, this project contributes data, methodology, and
research design insights to the literature in the political economy of development. First, I construct
two new datasets of lawsuits filed against politicians in Brazil, one for the electoral court system
and another for the state court of São Paulo. Next, I use multiple machine learning algorithms for
regression and text classification to find reasons for convicting politicians and predicting court
outcomes based on litigants’ characteristics. Third, I use the judicial review of trial and appeals
decisions, Monte-Carlo simulations of judicial rulings, and a quasi-natural experiment using two
different transparency policies to analyze the relationship between sanctions and politics in each
chapter. Though it is focused on Brazil, the impact of this study is broader; India, Mexico, and
South Africa share similar electoral oversight agencies and checks and balances systems such that
development research would greatly benefit from some of these insights.
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INTRODUCTION
In the past decade, there has been growing interest in understanding the relationship between
the law, economics, politics, and public policy. Studies have investigated judicial independence
under authoritarian regimes (Epperly, 2017), how courts interact with the media (Lim et al., 2015),
or even what conditions make independent judiciaries possible in development settings (Helmke and
Rosenbluth, 2009). These and many other studies have unpacked the judiciary black box, improving
our knowledge of its decision-making process and the factors determining judicial decisions beyond
case merits. In line with this scholarship, this dissertation project contributes to our understanding
of how judicial institutions interact with politics in development settings and to what extent they
improve the quality of government.
The first chapter, Electoral Crime Under Democracy: Information Effects from Judicial
Decisions in Brazil, looks at whether politicians convicted of electoral crimes also experience voter
punishment at the polls. If voters trust the judicial system, then its decisions should be important
sources of information driving one’s vote. A series of studies in recent years has shown that
information quality matters for electoral accountability (Winters and Weitz-Shapiro, 2013;
Weitz-Shapiro and Winters, 2014; Chong et al., 2015; Weitz-Shapiro and Winters, 2017; Pavão,
2018; Popkin, 1991; Lupia et al., 2000) but only a handful have looked specifically at information
signals from an independent branch of government. To test this hypothesis, I use a sample of
candidates accused of electoral crime in Brazilian municipal elections between 2004 and 2016 and
compare electoral results for candidates whose accusations were affirmed or dropped on appeal. The
results show that voters respond to judicial information and punish candidates with a criminal
record. These results are not explained by (potential) changes in judge, voter, or candidate behavior
over the electoral process and confirm that judicial information is a credible source of information
feeding voter decisions.
In the second chapter, Judicial Favoritism of Politicians: Evidence from Small Claims Courts, I
propose a theory of power collusion across branches of government where the judiciary might please
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or challenge the executive or the legislative in expectation of future benefits. In this setting, judicial
favoritism of politicians might exist when judges want to pressure or drive elected officials to
increase benefits to the judiciary. Using small claims cases, which are more homogeneous and less
vulnerable to unobservable differences in the judicial system, I find that judges rule significantly
against politicians in court. This suggests that judges use court decisions as a power move to warn
politicians and force their cooperation. To supplement the analysis, I implement various machine
learning regression algorithms to predict court outcomes and identify the most critical factors
driving bias. To my knowledge, this is the first comprehensive analysis of judicial favoritism of
politicians in developing countries.
Finally, chapter three, Active and Passive Transparency, investigates whether double
transparency is any better than single transparency for improving local governance. Though there
are many studies measuring the effect of active and passive transparency separately, these policies
are rarely implemented in isolation and this chapter fills in the gap. Using a random audit program
and combining it with a difference-in-differences design across the passing of the freedom of
information act in Brazil in 2012, I find that the joint implementation of active and passive
transparency improves municipal human development index (HDI). In addition to the main results,
I also investigate the cross-effects of passive transparency on corruption and active transparency on
information compliance.
Importantly, Brazil is the ideal case study to answer these research questions for two main
reasons. First, it is one of five largest democracies in the world. The evidence in this dissertation is
thus relevant for other large democracies beyond just the developing countries with which Brazil
shares certain electoral system similarities (e.g. Indonesia, India, Mexico, the Philippines, South
Africa). Secondly, Brazil has adopted an uniquely transparent institutional structure since the early
2000s but has not seen the expected improvement in governance as predicted by the new
institutional economics literature. This project should inform development policymakers and
scholars about the limitations of transparency, either in the judiciary or the executive, for delivering
social and economic development.
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CHAPTER 1
ELECTORAL CRIME UNDER DEMOCRACY: INFORMATION EFFECTS
FROM JUDICIAL DECISIONS IN BRAZIL
Summary
Most electoral crime studies have two main features: they investigate (1) severe, coercive
threats to elections which occur in (2) weak democracies and autocracies. Using Brazil as a case
study, I address these limitations by investigating how the disclosure of politicians’ criminal records
impacts voter behavior in a large democracy. The results show that voters respond to criminal
information disclosed by the judiciary and impose larger electoral penalties when crimes are more
severe. These results are not explained by (potential) changes in judge or candidate behavior neither
by voter engagement over the electoral process. I suggest the mechanism explaining voter behavior
is their trust in the judiciary system – a credible source of information unexplored by the
information shortcut literature.
Keywords: electoral politics; judicial politics; comparative politics; political economy.
JEL classification: D72; K42; P48.
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1.1 Introduction
Office-seeking politicians employ various tactics to get elected. They might promise voters the
provision of more local public goods, such as schools, hospitals, or roads; they promote their
candidacies by running ads on TV and, more recently, on social media; they might even meet with
their constituents and ask for their vote based on their personal connection. But they might also
resort to illegal, clandestine strategies: offer to buy votes, run fake news ads, or spend beyond
campaign spending limits. Politicians adopt these strategies expecting votes in return, but they risk
being discovered and prosecuted. This paper investigates how voters react when politicians are
exposed adopting these strategies.
Scholars have not ignored how illegal strategies impact elections. Lehoucq (2003) offers a
comprehensive account of the relationship between electoral fraud and election outcomes, discussing
the various forms of crime, such as procedural rule-breaking, illegal campaigning, violence, and vote
buying. In a more recent study, Gans-Morse et al. (2013) design a theoretical framework
encompassing four types of clientelism practices (vote, turnout, and abstention buying, and double
persuasion) and their adoption under five different institutional designs. They argue that the choice
of illegal action is conditional on the design of the electoral system. For instance, in an environment
of increased political polarization, we should expect to see more of turnout buying but less of vote
buying. However, the majority of these studies looking into electoral crimes have limited scope: first,
they are primarily concerned with coercive threats that prevent free and fair elections, but do not
address less flagrant electoral crime (campaign spending violations, for instance); second, they focus
heavily on autocracies and weak democracies (Asunka et al., 2017; Gandhi and Lust-Okar, 2009;
Ichino and Schündeln, 2012; Levitsky and Way, 2002; Schedler, 2015) but do not explore how these
tactics unfold in large democracies.
I overcome these limitations using a unique dataset of judicial decisions disclosing electoral
crimes in Brazil between 2004 and 2016. Every election, the courts review candidates’ applications
and issue candidacy authorization decisions in which they include current or past criminal activity
before election day. Using a sample of candidates running for municipal office (city council and
mayor), I compare electoral outcomes for candidates who have criminal records against those who
do not. To recover unbiased estimates of criminal information, I instrument information disclosed at
trial for information disclosed on appeals after election day. The latter cannot affect electoral
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outcomes but are intricately connected to trial information. In addition, I recover heterogeneous
information effects using the text in court documents. I train a classification algorithm to predict
what are the reasons for authorizing or dismissing candidacies, which contain information about the
severity of electoral crime allegations.
There are two theoretical contributions in this study. First, I show that rulings issued by
electoral courts on claims of electoral crime serve as signals of candidate type that help citizens
make voting decisions. This approach supplements the information shortcut literature (Popkin,
1991; Lupia et al., 2000, and others) as one of the first attempts at using court documents as sources
of candidate information. In a crowded candidate space, judicial sentences help distinguishing good
and bad candidates. Brazil’s recent democratic history and open data environment create a unique
context in which electoral litigation is very visible during campaign periods, and thus plays an
important role in voting decisions. Second, the present study contributes to the broader literature
on the political economy of development. Brazil has a unique system in which the judiciary branch
has independent State (TRE) and Federal (TSE) electoral courts resolving electoral disputes.
Understanding if electoral oversight mechanisms as such are effective is a valuable lesson for
countries with similar institutions (e.g. India, Mexico, South Africa), where these electoral bodies
play an unusual role in shaping up political representation by authorizing who runs for elected office.
The main instrumental variables result shows that revealing criminal information, i.e.,
convictions in court for electoral crimes, reduces the probability of election and a candidate’s vote
share by 10.3 and 12.9 percentage points, respectively. These estimates are statistically significant at
the one percent level and significantly differ from OLS estimates. These results are robust to the
inclusion of covariates and fixed-effects and inclusion or exclusion restriction checks. Convicted
candidates are also significantly further away from the vote threshold necessary for election in both
proportional (city council) and majoritarian (mayor) systems. The significant effect of convictions
means voters either punish or strategically defect from candidates in the presence of negative court
records. This is a novel information shortcut effect, and it supplements party label, interest group,
and media effects previously identified in the literature. It also closely aligns with similar studies
documenting a negative effect of corruption information on voting decisions in Brazil (Ferraz and
Finan, 2008, 2011; Winters and Weitz-Shapiro, 2013, and others). I further find that the disclosure
of more severe violations of electoral law (e.g., candidates or parties using illegal campaign
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strategies, channeling slush funds for campaign ads, having previous outstanding judicial convictions
preventing them from running for office) are more costly than trivial violations, indicating that
voters distinguish illegal behavior and use the type of crime in their decisions. In Weitz-Shapiro and
Winters (2017), voters state their dislike for corruption more strongly when the criminal information
comes from more credible sources; here, I show that voters act on criminal information originating
from the most respected branch of government in Brazil. Thus, I document that voters’ follow
through on their stated preferences, supplementing the evidence in Weitz-Shapiro and Winters
(2017). When candidates are cleared of severe accusations, however, they experience an
improvement in their electoral performance, likely to due to the ability of these electoral strategies
to sway voters in their favor. This result indicates a positive payoff of engaging in illegal strategies
as long as candidates are cleared by the courts.
In the remainder of this paper, I discuss the theoretical framework for the effect of criminal
information in section 1.2, and explain the institutional background in Brazil allowing for causal
identification in section 1.3. I present the data in section 1.4. Section 1.5 discusses the empirical
strategy of this paper, and section 1.6 presents its main results. Section 1.7 explores the exclusion
restriction tests. In section 1.8, I investigate alternative explanations for the negative effect on
performance. Section 1.9 discusses the heterogeneous punishment effects. Section 1.10 concludes
and suggests further avenues of research.
1.2 Court Signals of Electoral Crimes
Assume three representative agents are interacting in a democratic election: the candidate (C),
the voter (V ), and the judge (J). They each maximize their utility function f(Xc, εc), which
summarizes their electoral response to a matrix of observed and unobserved candidate characteristics
(Xc and εc). The former could be anything from policy positions, age, ethnicity, marital status, or
campaign expenditures. A candidate’s political ability, the deals they make with parties, supporters,
or sponsors are the latter. The more information voters have, the better they can choose their
preferred candidate. Popkin (1991) suggested that voters gather available signals to form an opinion
about candidates in an election. For instance, V might prefer highly-educated candidates, so V
seeks signals about a candidate’s educational background. Generally, however, V dislikes candidates
who have a criminal record because it signals dishonesty and indicates poor prospective political
performance. Thus, I separate criminal information cc from matrix Xc in V ’s utility function and
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set the first derivative of fV with respect to cc to negative, as follows in equations (1.1) and (1.2):




In addition to the representative voter’s preferences, I am also interested in candidate C ’s
behavior. C is looking to adopt strategies that maximize their electoral outcome. They cannot
withhold or control specific information, such as age, gender, ethnicity, but can choose amongst
campaign expenditure levels (included in Xc) and electoral strategies that get them closer to
winning an election. These strategies could be anything from running ads on TV and social media,
holding campaign events, or paying someone off the books to find dirt on their opponents. Clearly,
the last strategy is illegal, and candidates want to hide it from the public. Voters find illegal
strategies a dishonest move and would likely condemn such practices; candidates, however, would
still want to adopt them because they might shift support away from opponents and thus
compensate the potential loss from disclosure of criminal action. Therefore, C adopts a mix of
strategies such that their expected electoral payoff remains positive. Illegal strategies enter the
candidate’s utility function as bc.
UC = fC(Xc, cc, bc, εc) (1.3)
The focus in this paper is identifying how the disclosure of criminal records and illegal strategies,
respectively summarized by cc and bc, impact a candidate’s chances of election. More specifically, I
am looking at the effect of releasing electoral crime information on electoral performance. The
information could come from the media, an important source of candidate signals, but it could also
come from government authorities, such as the judiciary branch. The reasoning is straightforward.
Assuming an independent, high-quality judiciary, judge J hands out sentences based on case
evidence, either convicting or acquitting candidates, regardless of individual characteristics. Since
voters dislike crimes, and judges make criminal information available by ruling on candidate cases,
one can reasonably expect voters to interpret judicial decisions as signals of candidate type and
respond accordingly at the ballot. A conviction is a negative signal; an acquittal is a positive signal.
This mechanism would predict a negative first derivative ∂UC/∂cc < 0 for cc in equation (1.3):
convictions on record hurt a candidate’s chances to hold office. Some of this effect, however, could
be offset by the boost in votes that would come from illegal strategies bc. Suppose a candidate
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prints and distributes negative material on their opponents. The information in the advertisement is
false, and such ad is not allowed in the jurisdiction where this office race is taking place. Though
judges could eventually ban such material, once the information is out, it might hurt targeted
opponents beyond reparation. In such hypothetical scenario, the strategy was illegal but benefited
the candidate running the ad. In this case, ∂UC/∂bc > 0. I want to test both effects on electoral
performance.
1.3 Electoral Court System in Brazil
Brazil is a particularly interesting research setting because of the structure of its dedicated
electoral court. State (TRE) and Federal (TSE) Electoral Court systems have existed intermittently
since 1932 but only became institutionally relevant after the country’s return to democracy in 1985.
Since then, electoral courts have a fundamental role in guaranteeing free and fair elections. Their
mandate is to enforce the Electoral Code of 1965 and subsequent legislation, particularly the Law
Establishing Conditions for Ineligibility to Public Office (1990), the Law of Political Parties (1995),
the Law of Elections (1997), and the Clean Records Act of 2010. These courts have four primary
responsibilities: (i) electoral rule-making; (ii) judicial consultations clarifying and establishing
jurisprudence for conflicting electoral norms; (iii) administration of the electoral process, which
consists in publishing the electoral calendar, testing voting machines, distributing voting machines
to all districts, counting votes and publishing electoral results; and, finally, (iv) conflict resolution on
claims of breach of electoral law.
In this project, I am interested in the courts’ conflict resolution function and its underlying
judicial review process. According to Brazilian Law, every individual running for office, at every
level, has to submit proper documentation proving that they meet eligibility requirements for the
office to which they are running; for instance, they should be 35 years of age or older to run for
president or senator; executive-office holders, if running for any other elected office, must step down
from their current post six months before election day. Every electoral cycle, the highest-level
electoral court, TSE, establishes a calendar for submission of all eligibility documents, which are
reviewed at lower-level courts by electoral judges who issue rulings authorizing every single
candidacy in the country. These cases are called registro de candidatura (candidacy registration).
Importantly, these cases follow the usual judicial review process in Brazil. Local electoral
judges rule on every candidacy in the country and issue trial decisions either authorizing or
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dismissing candidacies. Judges check whether a candidate’s party has met all electoral requirements,
whether candidates have met all criteria of the office to which they are running, and other legal
provisions as established by electoral law. Candidates, opponents, or the Office of Electoral
Prosecution (MPE) can then appeal trial decisions. An appellate panel of electoral judges at the
state level, instead of the district level, reviews the appeal and either affirms or reverses the trial
decision. Since appeals can be filed by opponents or the MPE, candidacy registration cases are
unique in that they allow us to observe favorable and unfavorable decisions at both stages. Using
the timing according to which these decisions are issued, I can create exogenous variation in the
disclosure of electoral crime information and analyze its impact on elections.
1.3.1 Timing of Judicial Review as Exogenous Shock
An example helps detailing how the timing of decisions shocks a politician’s criminal record.
The most recent municipal election took place on Oct 2, 2016. The deadline for submitting all
candidacy documents was Aug 15, 2016. Between Aug 15 and Sep 12, trial courts reviewed and
authorized every candidacy for mayor or city council. The review process started at the electoral
district in which the candidate is running for office, and their trial ruling came out of the designated
electoral judge for that district. These judges are part of the state court system and, when
appointed to the electoral bench, were on leave from their original tenured positions at the state
system.1 They serve on two-year mandates, with one reappointment allowed, such that they never
oversee the same district for more than one electoral cycle. If either a candidate or someone else,
such as opponents or the MPE, filed an appeal to the trial ruling, the case was presented before a
panel of three judges at the state electoral court TRE. There are seven appellate court justices in
each state’s TRE, serving up to four-year mandates, and they are immune to local politics. In any
state, six of these judges are voted in by their fellow tenured judges at the state and federal court
systems and the last member is appointed by the President of Brazil. Plaintiffs or defendants
unhappy with the appellate decision further appealed their case before the federal court TSE, which
serves as the third and final instance of judicial review for mayor and city council candidates.
1In Brazil, judges are appointed to the bench in state and federal courts when they pass nationally-competitive
entrance examinations. They are automatically tenured after a two-year trial period; therefore, their entire career is
independent of electoral politics.
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The Sep 122 deadline is the main institutional element supporting causal inference, because it
allows the observation of electoral performance for politicians who have public criminal records. It is
the last day for entering candidate information onto electronic voting (EV) machines distributed at
every single polling station in the country.3 All candidates who have untried appeals by this date
will have their information loaded, and thus can be voted for, in the EV machines on election day.
Because of this feature, I can observe the electoral performance of candidates who are eventually
convicted of electoral crimes (criminal records disclosed) and compare to candidates who are
eventually cleared of these charges (clean records disclosed). If candidates saw a final ruling before
Sep 12, or if they have decided not to appeal their trial sentence, I cannot observe their performance
because TSE will not load their information in the EV machines.4 As such, these candidates are not
included in the analysis here.
Exogenous variation in the disclosure of criminal information comes from the timing according
to which higher-level courts issue appeals decisions. Often, the high number of candidates running
for municipal office, the judicial backlog, or the conditions of a particular electoral race make it
difficult for electoral courts to hand out final decisions by Sep 12. Moreover, since candidates with
standing appeals will have their information loaded onto EV machines regardless, there is no strong
incentive for courts to issue decisions between then and Oct 2. In the lead-up to election day, judges
and court officials are working around the clock making sure that 540,000+ working EV machines
reach 450,000+ voting stations across the whole territory of Brazil; judges are ruling on smaller
electoral cases that might or might not be appended to candidacy cases; court officials are meeting
with political parties and discussing the electoral situation, so on and so forth. It is not uncommon,
therefore, to see final decisions come out only after election day has passed, especially in municipal
elections. When appeals are not ruled in time for elections, the TSE loads candidate information
(picture, name, voting number) on the EV machine but their votes are computed sub judice – their
2The exact day varies marginally every cycle. In 2018, for instance, the deadline for candidacy submission was Aug
15, last day for loading candidate information was Sep 17, and election day was Oct 7.
3Fujiwara (2015) describes this technology in detail.
4There is no early voting in Brazil. Voters cast their ballot on a single day using the EV machines.
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vote count will be considered valid only when the TRE or TSE publish their final ruling. Effectively,
thus, the information released at the appeals stage cannot affect electoral outcomes, since they are
issued after election day has passed, but they bear a strong relationship to the sentence handed out
by the trial judge in each electoral district. Decisions at trial are mostly endogenous with respect to
local electoral conditions, since unobservable characteristics of each race might determined claims
brought up at trial (office competitiveness, visibility of electoral race, media scrutiny, and others),
but I can use appeals as instruments to isolate only the exogenous part of trial decisions.
The primary limitation of this study is that I can only recover (plausibly) causal effects of
criminal information under restrictive conditions pertaining to municipal elections in Brazil. Local
politicians have no control over the careers of electoral judges nor can they sanction judges. At any
other electoral race, however, Congress, Senate, and State Governor candidates are much more
powerful and can influence how electoral judges rule their cases. For instance, senators are much
more influential than city councilors and have a direct channel of communication with the President
of Brazil, who is responsible for appointing one judge per TRE. The second limitation is that several
candidates do not appeal their trial ruling and as such do not appear on the EV machine on election
day. Thus, I cannot observe electoral performance for every candidate who has had their type
revealed in the form of convictions for electoral crimes – just for the subgroup that filed an appeal
or has had a third-party appeal their candidacy. It is likely that the latter candidates are
heterogeneous in many dimensions when compared to candidates who have not appealed trial
decisions, such as their political experience, or their drive to hold elected office. Excluded from this
analysis, these candidates should be the object of future projects measuring the effect of judicial
(criminal) information on electoral performance in developing countries, and this paper inaugurates
such literature.
1.3.2 Applying the Model to the Brazilian Context
Brazil also has a unique open data environment, including court documents, allowing for the
investigation of criminal information effects on voter behavior. Information cues are critical factors
in democracy because they help voters overcome the rational ignorance problem (Nicholson and
Bowler, 2019); surprisingly, however, legal sources have not been explored as a factor informing
voting decisions. There is research documenting a significant influence on voter behavior from party
labels (Samuels and Zucco Jr., 2014), candidates’ gender (Aguilar et al., 2015a), their performance
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(Ferraz and Finan, 2008; Winters and Weitz-Shapiro, 2013; Weitz-Shapiro and Winters, 2014;
Winters and Weitz-Shapiro, 2016; Weitz-Shapiro and Winters, 2017), and even ethnicity when
voters have to choose amongst many candidates in large ballots (Aguilar et al., 2015b).5 Brazil is a
new democracy in which the electoral process is particularly popular, with extensive candidate and
electoral process coverage. For better or worse, candidates’ litigation history, personal issues, former
performance in office, and business arrangements are under the media’s scrutiny during campaign
months.6 Therefore, I can use court decisions as cues on candidate type, i.e., whether they are
honest or not, and contribute a new information effect to the literature.
More formally, by coding candidacy registration cases, I recover both cc and bc in equation
(1.3): UC = fC(Xc, cc, bc, εc). Sentence outcome, authorizing or dismissing a candidacy, makes up
cc; legal reasons justifying the sentence make up bc. In this study, there are two reasons why judges
prevent candidates from running for office: (1) trivial rule-breaking, which are cases in which
candidates are in breach of electoral law for minor reasons. For instance, they could have forgotten
to include a copy of their ID card in their application, or they could have missed a deadline in the
application process. In either case, their candidacy is deemed incomplete, and they are not allowed
to run for office; or (2) severe rule-breaking, which are more egregious cases in which either parties
or candidates are in breach of more substantial elements of electoral law. Parties might not have
kept, or presented, all financial records from previous elections, candidates might have an
outstanding conviction for previous crimes, or they might have been convicted for running illegal
campaign strategies against their opponents. These cases are much more likely to be connected to
campaign, office, or government crimes disliked by voters.
Another benefit of using candidacy registration cases to identify cc and bc is their standard
penalty. Judges disqualify candidacies when they do not meet all requirements, whether the
violations are trivial or severe; also, there is no jail time nor immediate financial penalties for
candidates and parties, making the legal punishment for candidacy convictions uniform. In general,
5Whether these cues come from identity voting or underlying policy preferences is beyond the scope of this paper. I
am only concerned with the extent to which cues shape voting decisions.
6More on how voters become aware of candidates’ criminal history in appendix A.1.
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electoral cases take less time to conclude (17 months on average) than other cases in the Brazilian
judicial system (26 months on average) (CNJ, 2018). Though standard sentences and penalties
might not be ideal from a policymaking perspective, they create a subset of legal cases less
susceptible to external influence and relatively stable in terms of the application of legal statutes
and convictions.7
Finally, these cases allow for the testing of heterogeneous information effects by conviction type.
If voters are sophisticated, not only they punish or strategically defect from candidates with
unfavorable trial rulings (the information disclosure effect), but they also differentiate their behavior
conditional on the type of criminal record (the information severity effect). One can reasonably
expect that candidates charged with more severe crimes, such as illegal campaign spending, or
convicted for previous crimes, signal a more systematic criminal behavior and should have less
support from voters than candidates missing deadlines or lacking hard copies of certain documents.
Though judicial punishment is the same, the electoral punishment could still reflect the relatively
more severe violations. There is substantial evidence in the literature against voter sophistication in
other information contexts (Avis et al., 2018; Banerjee et al., 2010; Chong et al., 2015; de Figueiredo
et al., 2011; Ferraz and Finan, 2011; Weitz-Shapiro and Winters, 2017; Winters and Weitz-Shapiro,
2013), but this paper explores yet another mechanism of providing information to voters (judicial
decisions).
1.4 Data
The primary data source for electoral performance is TSE’s repository of electoral data. TSE
publishes electoral results, vote counts, candidates’ individual characteristics, and their candidacy’s
situation on election day for all elections since 1994. I focus on the municipal elections after the
introduction of the EV machine in 2002. There are 16,791 candidates for mayor or city council in
this sample; these candidates appealed, or had third-parties appealing, the trial ruling on their
7These cases, however, are often appended to other cases at the electoral court system and can create financial
liabilities for candidates and their parties. The analysis of these other cases is beyond the scope of this study as they
do not meet the criteria for causal identification developed here. There is also growing interest for electoral court
reform in Brazil. Some experts criticize the fact that electoral justices do not have fixed appointments and thus do
not specialize in electoral crimes; others say that parties and candidates strategically avoid harsher punishments by
requesting other court systems to move charges to electoral courts, knowing that their punishments are constrained to
the electoral arena.
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candidacy case. These candidates were displayed in the EV device and could have been voted for on
election day. Their candidacy remained pending after elections; only if a favorable appeals ruling
came out were the elected candidates allowed to take up office. I create three outcomes from TSE’s
data to measure electoral performance: (1) the probability of election, which is a binary variable
taking up value one when the candidate received enough votes for election. For mayor candidates,
under majoritarian rule, this means 50 percent plus one of all valid votes. For city council
candidates, under proportional rule, this means having received enough votes to rank amongst the
most voted candidates within the designated number of vacancies in each municipality; (2) vote
share as the share of total valid votes; (3) vote distance to election cutoff, which is the percentage
point distance between a candidate’s vote share and the necessary votes for election.
Next, I scrape court documents containing the allegations against each candidate from the TSE
website. I developed software8 that downloads case files and sentences for all candidates in my
sample. Though the information is public, due to data availability limitations at the TSE, 99.3
percent of court documents come from candidates in the 2012 and 2016 municipal elections. I match
court documents to candidates using an individual identifier provided by the Electoral Court so that
I can recover all documents for each candidacy.
Table 1.1 reports the summary statistics of the sample.9 The average age is 46.3 years, and the
overwhelming majority of candidates is male. Eight percent of them have any political experience,
captured by whether they held any other elected office in the past. These candidates have reported,
on average, campaign spending of R$ 49,924. Using the current exchange rate, this is equivalent to
∼$10,000 per campaign. Fifty-seven percent have seen an unfavorable ruling from the trial judge at
their electoral district and 49.7 percent have had an unfavorable ruling after appealing their case to
higher courts. Notice that all candidates have seen charges brought against them at trial, otherwise
they would not have standing appeals by election day and would not be part of this sample; the
8For the benefit of research transparency and replication, all programs and analysis scripts are freely available online
on https://www.github.com/aassumpcao/tseresearch.
9I run covariate balance tests (available upon request) across convictions at trial to check whether the sample of
cleared and convicted candidates have different baseline characteristics. Except for campaign expenditure, there is no
significant difference at the 5 percent level across the full set of covariates.
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conviction variables here capture the information disclosure effect, or unfavorable decisions issued by
trial judges. If an electoral judge allowed a candidate’s run for office, then either the trial or appeals
variable becomes zero. Though not reported in table 1.1, I also collect information on candidates’
marital status and education.10 These are categorical variables, and the most frequent marital
status is married (62.6 percent) and education level is high school (30.8 percent). Finally, I report
the means for the three outcomes in this analysis. The mean probability of election is 19.4, while
the mean candidate’s vote share and vote distance to cutoff are 8.2 and −8.8 percentage points,
respectively.
1.5 Empirical Strategy
To examine the effect of criminal information disclosure on electoral performance, the ideal
experiment would require a homogeneous sample of candidates differing in only two dimensions:
their criminal activity (good politicians have clean records while bad politicians do not) and whether
their activity was disclosed by the courts (via convictions or acquittals). Assuming a random
distribution of criminal activities and disclosure of records, one could recover causal effects of
information for four groups of candidates: (1) bad type disclosed; (2) bad type undisclosed; (3) good
type disclosed; (4) good type undisclosed. This experiment is unfeasible, because in most cases one
cannot observe candidate type neither can one randomize the disclosure of criminal records. The
institutional design of candidacy registration cases in Brazil, however, is the best approximation of
this experiment. First, all candidates go through criminal background checks as they apply for
candidacy in the country. This is a requirement of electoral law, such that we can approximate their
type by computing their violations of candidacy requirements. Second, all background checks are
public since they are revealed in sentencing documents and all such documents are public in Brazil.
Since all criminal records are public, I can recover information disclosure effects for good and bad
type politicians in groups (1) and (3). Using the institutional design described in section 1.3.1, I
implement an instrumental variables (IV) strategy where the effect of the disclosure of politician
type is the local average treatment effect (LATE) for compliers, i.e., those who have been convicted
or acquitted at both judicial review stages. I depict these groups in a classic IV framework in figure
10I also have information on each candidate’s party and use it as fixed-effects in the empirical sections.
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1.1, where compliers are candidates with the same outcome at trial and on appeals.11
Serving as a baseline for the IV strategy, I first estimate the following OLS model in three ways
and using all three different measures of electoral performance:
yi = α+ ρ · ci +Xβ +
∑
λi,k + εi (1.4)
For candidate i, I compute yi as (1) the probability of election, (2) the total vote share of
candidate i and (3) i’s vote distance to the election cutoff. They are all measured in percentage
points. X is the matrix of candidate characteristics, such as candidate age, gender, marital and
education status, political experience, and campaign spending;
∑
λi,k is a set of k fixed-effects to
capture any additional unobservable heterogeneity coming from party, election, and municipal
factors shared by subsets of candidates.
The main independent variable is the binary indicator for convictions for electoral crime cc at
the electoral court system for candidate i. These convictions are public information, so they are
equivalent to the disclosure of criminal information to voters. If a candidacy has been rejected by
the trial judge responsible for that electoral district, c becomes one. I use convictions at trial in OLS
regressions for benchmarking the biased effect on electoral performance; in reduced-form regressions,
I replace convictions at trial for convictions on appeal – which becomes one when the candidate has
seen an unfavorable ruling at higher courts within the electoral system. The reduced-form
regressions hint at any potential correlation between instruments and outcomes beyond the channel
via the endogenous decision at trial (discussed in section 1.7). I lastly estimate model (1.4) using
two-stage least squares (2SLS) regressions, in which I instrument convictions at trial for convictions
on appeals. Since I am looking at appellate court decisions issued after election day, the exclusion
restriction is straightforward as I measure the instrument after observing the outcomes.12 Any effect
11Candidates who break the electoral code but are not detected are not part of this study, neither are candidates who
have chosen not to appeal their trial sentence.
12In addition to the temporal effect, the other theoretical arguments discussed in section 1.3 support the exogeneity of
the instrument. Electoral judges are tenured state judges which have no ties to local politicians. Their wages, career
prospects, and time on electoral bench are all independent of the action of mayors and city councilors.
16
of disclosing appellate decisions influences electoral performance only via their relationship with
convictions at trial. I address additional concerns on violations to the exclusion restriction in the
following sections, but the instrumental variables and the first-stage regression equations are:
yi = α+ ρ · ĉi,trial +Xβ +
∑
λi,k + εi (1.5)
ci,trial = α+ ρ · ci,appeals +Xβ +
∑
λi,k + εi (1.6)
For every specification of equations (1.5) and (1.6), I estimate versions excluding and including
individual characteristics (matrix X) and fixed-effects
∑
λi,k. In addition to instrument validity
tests, I also report coefficient stability tests across different specifications to demonstrate that
selection on unobservables is not driving the results, as discussed in Altonji et al. (2005); Nunn and
Wantchekon (2011); Oster (2019); Pei et al. (2019). I discuss and test other alternative, confounding
explanations in the following sections and provide the empirical strategy at each stage of the
analysis.
1.5.1 Inclusion Restriction Checks
The first step in this analysis is guaranteeing I have a strong instrument for the endogenous
regressor of interest (conviction at trial). Table 1.2 provides us anecdotal evidence on the
relationship between convictions at either stage of the judicial review process. The overall reversal
rate of trial decisions is 18.58 percent. Reversals come mostly from candidacy cases that had been
denied by trial judges (23.05 percent). The unconditional Pearson correlation coefficient between
convictions at trial and on appeals is .637. These results make intuitive sense given the presumed
quality of judges and standard sentencing (both in substance and form) discussed in previous
sections.
A more robust test, however, is reported in table 1.3. I present three first-stage regressions on
the relationship between the endogenous variable (convictions at trial) and instrument (convictions
on appeals). Across models progressively including candidate characteristics and municipal,
electoral, and party fixed-effects, the coefficient on the instrument is always statistically significant
(p-value < .01). The magnitude remains stable within the .629-.522 range, which means that a
conviction on appeals explains roughly sixty percentage points of the outcome at trial. The positive
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relationship confirms the anecdotal evidence in table 1.2.
I additionally report each coefficient’s point estimate, confidence intervals (CIs), and
F -statistics for all three regressions in figure 1.2. The inclusion of covariates and fixed-effects across
models marginally shifts down the magnitude of instrument estimates. In all cases, however, the
F -statistic of excluded instruments remains greater than industry standards at F = 10 (Bound
et al., 1995). It means that the first-stage model is significantly predicting the candidacy outcome at
trial and confidently partials out the causal effect of convictions on electoral performance.
In table 1.4, I present the Hausman tests for OLS consistency. I report the results for bivariate
regressions between convictions at trial and on appeals for all outcomes.13 Each row contains the
F -stat and p-values for the null of OLS consistency. I reject consistency for all outcomes (p-value <
.01).
These tests confirm instrument choice and substantially support inclusion restriction conditions
for estimating LATE under an IV design. After the results section, I also conduct exclusion
restriction tests to provide further support for information effects in this paper.
1.6 Results
Table 1.5 reports the information disclosure effect (via trial conviction) on the probability of
election of each politician. For mayor candidates, this variable turns on when the candidate was the
most voted in their election. For city council candidates, this variable turns on when the candidate
has received enough votes to finish the election within the number of open seats in their
municipality. For instance, if a municipality has 12 seats in its city council, a candidate who
received the same number, or more, votes than the 12th placed candidate has outcome value one.14
It is the most important outcome and directly tests the first theoretical claim suggested in section
13I also run multivariate versions of Hausman tests, but there are no changes to p-values. Results are available upon
request.
14City council elections are not necessarily decided in such manner; TSE tallies up all votes in a single election and
divides them up by the number of seats available. All candidates who have more votes than this mark are
automatically elected to office; remaining seats go to the coalitions who have rounded up more votes. Only rarely,
however, all city councilors are elected like so. In most cases, votes are usually spread out across many candidates and
coalitions, so being voted in as the last candidate within the number of available seats does guarantee their election
and supports their coalitions to get further seats. In addition, this is a less strict way to define who is elected to city
council such that, even if there are measurement errors in coding this outcome, the correct measurement would
decrease the number of elected candidates and reinforce the conviction effect.
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1.2; in other words, voters would impose electoral penalties using information cues about criminal
activity; another way to state this is that convictions for electoral crimes signal candidate type and
influence voting decisions.
In columns 1-3 of table 1.5, I report the OLS estimates. The point estimates start at a
9.3-percentage point reduction on the probability of election but decrease to 6.3 percentage points in
model 3, which includes candidate controls and fixed-effects. All effects are significant (p-value <
.01). Therefore, regardless of the specification, there is a negative baseline relationship between
criminal information and performance. Unsurprisingly, the inclusion of covariates and fixed-effects
soaks up some of the variation in the conviction variable, and controls for observed factors
potentially correlated with convictions.
This biased result alone is interesting. It suggests that judicial decisions are also relevant
information mechanisms influencing voter decision, a relationship yet undocumented in the literature.
In Nicholson and Bowler (2019), there are many examples of information cues in the form of party
labels, sociodemographic characteristics, politician performance, interest groups, or the media, but
there are no examples of legal cues from court documents. This finding fills in an important gap in
the literature by documenting the effect of disclosing information from a trustworthy source on voter
behavior: in the U.S., people trust the judicial branch (68 percent) more than the executive (45
percent) and the media (41 percent) (Gallup, 2017, 2018); in Brazil, they trust the judiciary (24
percent) more than political parties (7 percent) and the executive (6 percent) (Ramos et al., 2017).
The unbiased effect of judicial information, however, is harder to assess. First, though voters trust
the judiciary more than other sources of information, the vocabulary and intricacies of legal cases
might make it harder to interpret judicial decisions. For instance, voters might not understand the
different electoral crimes and assign equal punishment to all convictions. Second, the information
released in court documents is a function of the conditions of individual electoral races. Repeated
candidates and incumbents are more exposed to legal action than new candidates. I explore the
latter mechanism first, and address the interpretation of court documents in section 1.9.
A plausible hypothesis is that some electoral races are more relevant than others and, as such,
there is more competition for seats than otherwise. Candidates might even be less likely to play by
the rules and bring many unfounded claims against their opponents in an attempt to disqualify
them from the race. Alternatively, some races might have more skilled politicians than others. In
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any of these cases, the resulting claims against candidates are not randomly distributed, and are
likely correlated with unobservable factors at each race. To partial out such confounding effects, I
implement the instrumental variables strategy discussed in section 1.5, and report its results in
columns 4-6. Note that all IV coefficients have significantly larger magnitudes than their OLS
equivalents (again at the one percent level). They range from −14.3 to −10.3 percentage points in
models 4 and 6, respectively. They suggest an upward bias in OLS estimates of about 4 percentage
points if we compare paired models; OLS predicts a smaller, weaker impact of information on
performance. Along with the evidence of Hausman tests in section 1.5, these factors support IV
consistency and its asymptotic convergence to the true, unbiased information effect on voter
response. For any given candidate, a conviction at trial alone would reduce their probability of
election by 10.3 percentage points, according to my preferred model (column 6).
This result supports the negative information effect (suggested in section 1.2) and aligns with
similar evidence in the literature. Ferraz and Finan (2008) report a smaller effect of 7 percentage
points for mayors when audit reports reveal corruption before elections in 2004. Though the effect
here is larger for less severe crimes, the candidates in Ferraz and Finan (2008)’s sample are generally
much more experienced than in this paper. The share of re-elected mayors in Ferraz and Finan
(2008) is 58.5, compared to 19.4 percent of experienced politicians in this sample, anecdotally
suggesting that ability would indeed offset some of the negative information effect (see Winters and
Weitz-Shapiro, 2013; Pereira and Melo, 2015).
In table 1.6, I report the results of the same regressions using the vote share outcome. The OLS
estimates are in columns 1-3 and show a negative and significant effect of criminal information on
candidates’ vote share, ranging from −9.7 to −5.5 percentage points. The IV effect is about five
percentage points smaller than the OLS’s. In my preferred model (column 6), the conviction effect
significantly reduces vote share by 12.9 percentage points (p-value < .01). I should point out that
the difference between OLS and IV parameters in this model is half the magnitude in the model for
outcome one, which could create some skepticism about the marginal gain of using IV. The closer
their magnitudes are, the smaller is the gain from trading bias (OLS) for consistency (IV). However,
both the Hausman tests in section 1.5.1 and the fact that the 99 percent CIs around OLS and IV
coefficients never overlap indicate IV as the best choice for measuring the information effect of
electoral crimes.
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The effect on outcome two is larger than in comparable studies. Ferraz and Finan (2008) report
a 10.4-percentage point decrease in vote share when mayors are running for reelection and have had
corruption evidence released to the public prior to municipal elections in 2004. Chong et al. (2015)
run an experiment before the municipal elections in three Mexican states in 2009 and find a 1.1
decrease in incumbent mayors’ vote share when corruption information is revealed to the public.
The differences in research design, however, explain why the effect in these studies is smaller. First,
both Ferraz and Finan (2008) and Chong et al. (2015) are looking at the effect for incumbent
politicians when there is evidence of corruption. These politicians are likely more skilled than the
average and thus offset the negative impact of information with their ability. Second, they only look
at mayors, rather than city councilors. The former have more visibility in local politics than the
latter, which again could offset the negative impact of criminal information. When I reestimate the
model in column 6 for the sample of mayor candidates who have political experience (unreported
here but available upon request), the information effect remains significant and negative but falls to
1.4 percentage points – marginally greater than Chong et al. (2015). Thus, I have reason to believe
the effect size here is consistent with a sample of less skilled local politicians.
I lastly investigate the information effect for outcome three, vote distance to election cutoff.
This effect represents how much information disclosure widened (or narrowed) the vote distance
from election thresholds. In this analysis, I split the sample into city council and mayor candidates
because of the meaningful differences in each office race. Mayor elections follow majority rule; city
council elections follow proportional rule. As such, the number of candidates is much smaller, and
the votes needed for election much larger, in mayor elections. Therefore, the distance to election is
not uniform across office type; in other words, a one percentage point distance is much harder to
come by in city council rather than in mayor races.
Table 1.7 presents these results. Columns 1-2 display OLS specifications and columns 3-4
display IV models. I only report regressions with individual controls and fixed-effects. I find that
releasing information of conviction at trial has again a negative and significant effect (at the one
percent level) on the vote distance to the election cutoff across all models. For the city council
sample, the IV coefficient points to 0.9 percentage points less in the distance to election than in the
absence of a crime; for the mayor sample, this effect is 14.1 percentage points. Thus, candidates
accused, and found guilty, of violating electoral law generally place further away from the necessary
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votes to guarantee election – in line with the impact on outcomes one and two.
I document a robust, negative criminal information effect on electoral performance across all
models. The IV estimates never overlap with their OLS equivalents. When different research designs
are accounted for, these results align well with previous evidence in the literature. In the following
sections, I conduct multiple robustness checks to support the negative, unbiased, and significant
effect of judicial information.
1.7 Exclusion Restriction Checks
In section 1.5.1, I carried out three tests validating the inclusion restriction of convictions on
appeal as an instrument for convictions at trial. In section 1.3, I also discussed how the TSE’s
appellate process qualifies for the exclusion restriction. Though there are no empirical tests for the
exclusion restriction, I conduct two indirect checks which support my instrument choice: (i)
correlation tests including the instrument in the first-stage; and (ii) coefficient stability tests
following Altonji et al. (2005), Oster (2019), and Pei et al. (2019).
1.7.1 Instrument Included in Second-Stage
The first test in support of the exclusion restriction is relatively straightforward. I run two sets
of regressions for all outcomes. In group one, the main independent variable is the conviction at
trial. In group two, it is the conviction on appeal. For each set, I estimate a bivariate model, a
multivariate model including individual controls, and a multivariate model including individual
controls and all fixed-effects (party, municipal, and election effects). The regressions in group one
are the same as the OLS regressions in table 1.5. The regressions in group two just replace the
endogenous variable for the instrument. My goal is to test whether there is an independent
correlation between the instrument and the other covariates which would be biasing IV estimates. I
report the results in figure 1.3, where there are four panels, one for each of the outcomes (1) and (2)
and one per split sample of outcome (3). In light gray, I plot the OLS coefficient on convictions at
trial and its 99 percent CI for all outcomes and regression models, yielding a total of 12 estimates
and CIs. I do the same for convictions on appeals, the reduced-form OLS model, and produce the
same estimates and CIs (in black).
It is clear that the instrument is significantly correlated with the outcome of interest. No 99
percent CI in the appeals regressions includes zero. This is expected when the instrument passes
inclusion restriction tests. The more important result, however, is the similarity of point estimates
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using either the trial or appeals convictions. For all models including individual covariates and
fixed-effects, all point estimates of appeals coefficients fall inside trial CIs. The correlation between
either variable, covariates, and fixed-effects is the same, meaning that the instrument is not adding
any more variance to the trial regression. In other words, there is additional support for
cov(z,X) = cov(x,X). Almost all of the effect of instrument z on outcome y occurs via its
correlation with x. Along with the evidence in the previous section and the institutional design of
judicial review of candidacy registration cases, I can confidently say that there is no independent
effect of the instrument on the outcomes of interest.
1.7.2 Coefficient Stability Tests
The most common way to address omitted variable bias is to include controls in the regression
of interest. In this paper, I repeatedly report parameter estimates progressively including candidate
controls, party, municipal, and election fixed-effects. In many cases, however, the set of controls
does not fully identify confounding effects. In fact, scholars rarely use the full set of confounding
factors; instead, they use the observed, available confounders. Unless available variables fully
capture the confounding set, selection on unobservables could still explain a significant portion of
the parameters we are estimating in linear models.
Oster (2019) formalizes this point. She suggests that coefficient stability across regression
models is only a reliable indication of unbiasedness if scaled by changes in the amount of regression
variation explained by independent variables. In other words, the coefficient of interest should move
relatively less than R2, indicating the stability of effect size as the researcher shifts explained
variation from the error term to the matrix of independent variables. The following equation in
Oster (2019) translates this idea:
β∗ = β̃ − δ · [β0 − β̃] · Rmax − R̃
R̃−R0
(1.7)
Where β∗ is the bias-adjusted coefficient; β̃ is the coefficient in the unrestricted regression; β0 is
the coefficient in the restricted regression; R̃ and R∗ are their respective R2. In this setting, we are
interested in adjusting δ and Rmax such that we can test how β̃ fares against β∗: δ is the degree of
selection on unobservables (i.e., proportion of outcome variation explained by unobservable variation
over observable variation); Rmax is the theoretical population variance explaining the outcome.
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Altonji et al. (2005) and Oster (2019) suggest that δ = 1 is a reasonable threshold for coefficient
stability, which means that unobservable and observed variables are equally able to explain β̃.
To support the exclusion restriction, I use equation (1.7) to compare the effect of coefficient
magnitudes on the probability of election using the two conviction variables (at trial and on
appeals). It is a similar exercise to the test in section 1.7.1, where I run two sets of regressions one
with each conviction variable. I generate the bias-adjusted coefficients in each set, β∗trial and β
∗
appeals,
under different Rmax assumptions to verify whether coefficient distributions overlap across models.
In Oster (2019), the author suggests that [β̃, β∗] represents bounds on true value of coefficients when
adding controls to regression models. If these confidence intervals overlap, I have additional
evidence that cov(z,X) = cov(x,X) such that unobservable variation would not be driving the
magnitude of the main results in IV models.
I present the results in table 1.8. It depicts the bounded estimates suggested by Oster (2019)
under different Rmax assumptions and δ = 1. It indicates the potential bias in coefficient estimates
by looking at how their magnitudes would change if I was able to use more of the variation in the
error term to explain the outcome variable. In other words, I compare potential coefficient estimates
if I could fully identify all omitted variables and included them in the model, shifting unexplained
variation to explained variation. Columns (1) and (2) show that the bounded estimates of either
coefficient magnitude overlap, suggesting that there is no independent correlation of the error term
with the instrument. In other words, cov(z|x, ε) = 0.
1.8 Alternative Explanations
There are additional threats to validity beyond the inclusion and exclusion restrictions. They
originate from data-generation processes and cannot be detected by any single identification
strategy. In this section, I explore how strategic changes of judge sentencing behavior, voter
engagement, or candidate campaigning behavior during the judicial review process could explain the
information effect. If they are true, then what I am picking up is something different than voters’
strategic responses to candidates’ types.
1.8.1 Heterogeneous Sentencing across Review Stages
The first alternative explanation to the criminal information effect is the potential change in
judges’ sentencing behavior over case duration. Both elections and judicial review coincide in time,
and judges could change how they sentence candidates based on campaign promises, policy
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positions, or even as a response to electoral results: judges might have a hard time issuing sentences
preventing candidates who received the most votes from taking up office. To test this mechanism, I
provide indication that judicial decision-making factors are not differentially affecting trial and
appeals sentencing, i.e., that conviction signals are the same over the electoral period. Judges
should be using the same criteria, and weighing them the same, when reviewing candidates’ cases at
trial and on appeal. To that end, I implement a modified version of Pei et al. (2019)’s covariate
balancing test, which constitutes regressing variables of interest on other covariates.
The test is as follows. First, I run two independent regressions with conviction variables on the
left-hand side. The respective dependent variables are conviction at trial and on appeals. I report
these regressions in columns 1 and 2 of table 1.9. Besides including the same covariates as before, I
also include the main electoral outcome, whether the candidate had enough votes to take up office,
on the right-hand side. It is the most important sentencing factor, as judges might be less willing to
convict candidates once they know these people have had enough votes to take up office. I also
include party-fixed effects, and cluster standard errors at the municipality-election pair level to
account for the shared variation of standard errors at the judge level (each judge oversees one
electoral district one election at a time). Finally, I run a t-test on the difference between each
parameter across regressions. Columns 3-6 respectively report the difference in coefficients, the joint
distribution of standard errors, t-stats, and the p-value of each test. The null hypothesis is that the
parameter difference is zero, meaning that the factor has the same effect on the trial and the
appeals decision.
The results in table 1.9 are evidence of homogeneous sentencing over the judicial review process.
The difference in parameters is not statistically significant at any industry standard. No p-value is
smaller than .13 (column 6). Moreover, it does not seem that being elected to office (outcome one)
changes the way judges rule on a particular candidate’s case; the difference of −.024 is not
significant (p-value = .649). This is strong evidence in favor of homogeneous sentencing, as judges
do not seem to be changing their sentencing behavior over time neither are they conditioning
decisions on election status. This is consistent with the institutional design of the electoral court
system in Brazil. In local elections, trial rulings are issued by electoral district judges, who face both
career and monetary incentives independent of local politics; appeals are decided by a panel of three
judges at the state level, who are appointed to the electoral bench by fellow judges in state and
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federal systems, and the President of Brazil. Therefore, there is no evidence that heterogeneous
sentencing would be driving the effect discussed in section 1.6.
1.8.2 Voter Disengagement Effect
A second source of concern is whether voters also change their behavior once they learn
candidates’ trial outcomes. While this could mean they change their votes as punishment or
strategic defection once they learn about a candidate’s criminal information, this could also mean
disengagement of the political process altogether. In this scenario, rather than punishing candidates
for criminal behavior, voters would become frustrated with politics. The mechanism behind the
information effect would be disengagement rather than strategy (Pavão, 2018; Chong et al., 2015).
I cannot disentangle this effect by only looking at the main results from section 1.6. Instead, I
have to look at other election outcomes to check for signals of disengagement. The first signal comes
from voter turnout. If voters are frustrated with the electoral process, e.g., they believe candidates
are dishonest because they observe convictions for electoral crimes, then one potential reaction is
simply skip voting. Though Brazil has mandatory voting in place, the costs of not voting are
negligible. Voters only have to fill out a no-show form, either online or in person. If they do not,
they have to pay a $1 fine. In this case, a decrease in voter turnout if the TSE convicts more
candidates would be evidence of disengagement. Another related signal is the number of invalid
(spoiled) votes in each municipal election. Voters could show up to the ballot but intentionally cast
a blank vote or type in a non-existing candidate number in the electronic voting machine, both
qualifying as invalid votes in Brazil. Thus, another evidence of disengagement could come from a
higher number of invalid votes when there are more convicted candidates running for office.
I report the results of these tests in table 1.10, where I aggregate up voter turnout and invalid
votes to the party and election-level. The most accurate aggregation of criminal information would
be the computation of the share of convicted candidates over the total number of candidates at each
race. If there were 100 candidates at a single race and 25 of these individuals were convicted at trial,
the share of convictions would be 25 percent. However, the proportion of invalid candidacies over
total candidacies is very small. Out of an initial sample of ∼200,000 local office candidates, only
16,791 people have unfavorable decisions at trial but stay in the race. This means that the share of
invalid candidacies over total candidacies would have a very small variance across all elections in my
sample. It would be hard to reject the null between share of convicted candidates and voting
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outcomes. I could mistake the null effect coming from low variation for the null effect of no
correlation. Instead, I want to make it easy to reject the null, for then I am more certain that there
is no voter disengagement effect. Therefore, I construct measures of the share of convicted
candidates, both at trial and on appeals, over the total number of office vacancies in every
election.15 I intentionally inflate the denominator of the share of convicted candidates to avoid null
rejection for low variation. In columns 1 and 3, I find no relationship between convictions and voter
turnout for both aggregation levels. This means that the number of convicted candidates per party
or election does not affect turnout. Voters still cast their ballots regardless of how many politicians
had criminal records disclosed. In columns 2 and 4, the share of convicted candidates has a
significant and positive relationship with invalid votes. Voters still get out to vote, but once at the
voting station, they cast more invalid votes when there are more convicted candidates (either per
party or election) running for office. However, the effect size is almost meaningless. A one
percentage point increase in the share of convicted candidates by party only increases invalid votes
by 0.276 percent; similarly, one percentage point increase in the share of convicted candidates by
election only increases invalid votes by 0.183 percent. Together, these results do not point to
disengagement as the main driver behind the criminal information effect.
1.8.3 Candidates Quit Campaigning
The third alternative explanation would come from campaign responses after candidates receive
an unfavorable trial ruling. Candidates who receive such ruling might anticipate the eventual
disqualification of their candidacy by the appellate panel such that they, partially or entirely, quit
campaigning. As a consequence, the hit to electoral performance would come from a candidate effort
rather than a voter strategy effect. I believe this to be a minor problem for the simple reason that
my sample only contains candidates who remained engaged in their race to office – evidenced by
their filing of an appeal against their trial sentence. This is a limitation of the instrumental
variables design more generally, and it is likely that the candidates in this sample are not the same
as the population of candidates in local elections in Brazil, but it stills fends against claims of
15In mayor races, for instance, this means that the share of invalid candidacies might yield values greater than one for
the simple reason that there is always just one open spot for mayor in each municipality. These tests place a higher
bar for rejecting the voter disengagement hypothesis, providing yet more confidence in my results.
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candidate disengagement. Second, any strategic candidate believing they have a shot at election
would do well to keep campaigning since the judicial penalty (dismissal of candidacy) is small
compared to the benefit of holding office. Candidates would be willing to take a gamble with small
risk but high reward.
Nevertheless, I provide anecdotal evidence to dismiss concerns about candidates making such
large shifts in their campaign strategies. In table 1.11, I compare the mean campaign expenditure
across various subgroups of candidates. Campaign expenditures do not fully capture the extent to
which campaigns are adjusted, but are a good proxy to understand campaigning behavior. I first
compare mean spending for candidates by the type of trial and appeals ruling they receive. The
mean spending of candidates with favorable rulings at trial (R$79,099, or ∼$18,800) is much higher
than candidates with unfavorable rulings (R$35,402, or ∼$8,430). The same is true for outcomes on
appeals. I can thus anecdotally claim that there is an association between campaign spending and
judicial outcomes, which is not surprising; for precisely this reason, I control for campaign spending
in all regressions of this paper. The more interesting result, however, is the bottom row of table 1.11.
For the subgroup of candidates who received an unfavorable ruling at trial, campaign spending is
not associated with better outcomes on appeal. Campaign spending is statistically the same
(p-value = .53), and their respective means are R$39,004 and R$34,324. Unfortunately, I cannot
observe expenditure dates, which would be a better proxy for campaign engagement, but the
indirect evidence here is that candidates who needed to reverse a trial ruling have not differently
spent money on their campaigns. If they had spent more, we would see an engagement effect trying
to revert unfavorable rulings. If they had spent less, we would find evidence in favor of candidate
disengagement. None of these explanations apply, and this is additional evidence that the main
effect can be attributed to voter’s strategic behavior.
1.9 Heterogeneous Electoral Punishment
Besides the primary information disclosure effect, I want to identify whether voters impose
heterogeneous (electoral) punishment by information type. I call this the information severity effect.
In an stylized world, severe electoral code violations should be met with harsher electoral penalties
when compared to trivial violations. Though intuitive, this effect has not been confirmed elsewhere
in the literature: (1) voters might not punish candidates as expected because they might interpret
criminal information as evidence of action rather than inaction (Pereira and Melo, 2015, discuss how
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voters trade off corruption for public goods); (2) they might not trust the source of information on
criminal behavior, or might not understand the information being disclosed (Winters and
Weitz-Shapiro, 2013; Weitz-Shapiro and Winters, 2017); (3) they might even lack options, and end
up voting for the least dishonest candidate (Pavão, 2018). None of these studies, however, looks at
the disclosure of legal information in the form of judicial decisions. If voters trust the judiciary more
than other branches of government, then they might respond more immediately to judicial
information.
To estimate such effect, I collect and code court documents for all candidates running for
municipal office in 2012 and 2016, and a few in 2004 and 2008. For 2016, I also have official TSE
classification of conviction types.16 There are eight conviction categories, and I group them in two
classes: (1) violations to the Law of Political Parties (1995), the Law of Elections (1997), the Clean
Records Act (2010), and (2) documentation problems. Severe rule-breaking are egregious cases in
which either parties or candidates are in breach of substantial elements of electoral law, such as
using illegal campaign strategies, channeling slush funds for campaign ads, sexual assault, murder,
corruption, and having been convicted in criminal cases in the past. These crimes come from the
legislation under the jurisdiction of the electoral court: the Electoral Code of 1965, the Law
Establishing Conditions for Ineligibility to Public Office (1990), the Law of Political Parties (1995),
the Law of Elections (1997), and the Clean Records Act of 2010. This is why I group the first three
laws into the severe rule-breaking class. Trivial rule-breaking are cases in which candidates lack a
procedural requirement to run for office, such as missing documentation, not meeting deadlines, or
not having submitted notarized documents. For instance, they could have forgotten to include a
copy of their ID card in their application, or they could have missed a deadline in the application
process. They make up the documentation group. Next, I use seven machine (text) classification
models to predict these two conviction classes for all candidates in the 2004 and 2008 elections. I
pre-process the text of the sentences and convert all words to unigram and bigram combinations and
use them as inputs in Linear-Support Vector, Multinomial Bayes, Logistic, Random Forest,
16Though documents are public, the TSE had many errors in the system that prevented me from downloading almost
all case files for 2004 and 2008.
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Adaptive and Gradient Boosting classification models. I also convert unique words in sentences to
300-dimension word tensors using Facebook’s FastText dataset (Joulin et al., 2016). These tensors
serve as weights in the last classification model using Deep Neural Networks. Once these
classification algorithms have been trained on 2016 data, I apply the models to predict classes in
earlier elections, which were not disclosed by the TSE, in a standard application of supervised
machine classification.17 These predictions form a new binary variable bi (from equation 1.3), where
bi = 1 is the disclosure of a severe violation of electoral law and bi = 0 is the disclosure of a trivial
violation.
I then include bi in equation (1.5).The relevant parameters are the information disclosure effect
(ρ0), the information severity effect (ρ1), and their interaction (ρ2). Equation (1.8) summarizes
these relationships:
yi = α+ ρ0 · ĉi,trial + ρ1 · bi + ρ2 · ĉi,trial × bi +Xβ +
∑
λi,k + εi (1.8)
Compared to equation (1.5), the only new element is the interaction effect ρ2 and it captures
the heterogeneous crime severity effect from candidates’ criminal records. Note that, in the absence
of a conviction at trial, ρ1 is the raw association between electoral crimes and electoral performance.
It represents the potential gain of engaging in an activity prohibited by law because it indicates an
accusation of a severe crime (bi = 1) which is cleared by the courts (ci = 0).
To make the interpretations clearer, I lay out the four alternative explanations of the joint
effect of conviction and crime type in table 1.12: if ρ1 = 0, engaging in an electoral crime has no
payoff; if ρ1 > 0, engaging in an electoral crime has a positive electoral payoff; if ρ2 = 0, voters
punish candidates the same, regardless of the accusation against them; if ρ2 < 0, voters fit electoral
punishment to the crime; in other words, severe violations receive larger electoral penalties.
Table 1.13 reports results of the estimates of the information severity effect. The first result
that stands out is that the criminal information effect ρ0 remains significant and negative. However,
being cleared from severe accusations almost entirely compensates for the accusations (ρ0 = −.069
17I discuss these classification algorithms in more detail in appendix A.2.
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and ρ1 = .062). When the candidate is convicted, it accounts for almost half the total information
effect (ρ = −.103 in main results and ρ0 + ρ1 + ρ2 = −.058). For vote share, severity makes up
almost all of the information effect: the main effect of ρ = −.129 loss is close to
ρ0 + ρ1 + ρ2 = −.101. These results provide support for the offsetting effect of engaging in severe
breaches of electoral law. In addition, I reject the homogeneous punishment hypothesis. The ρ2
effect is negative and significant in the model for outcomes one and two. This result means that
voters punish, or strategically defect from, candidates convicted for more severe violations of
electoral law more strongly than those who were found guilty of trivial violations.
The most suited explanation to the heterogeneous effect is in the bottom right quadrant of
table 1.12. There is an electoral gain of engaging in severe electoral rule-breaking, but voters punish
these candidates more harshly when the judiciary makes the severe violation public. This is a
particularly interesting result as it extends the findings in Weitz-Shapiro and Winters (2017). Using
a vignette experiment, the authors document a positive relationship between information credibility
and intention to vote for mayor candidates in Brazil; here, I find that voters acted on criminal
information in local elections in Brazil between 2004 and 2016.
The results for outcome three are, however, puzzling. I find no heterogeneous effect on vote
distance to cutoff for the city council sample and a positive effect for the mayor sample. One
interpretation is electoral crimes have different effects across the distribution of candidates. Voters
might not care if candidates for city council seats have committed severe or trivial crimes because
they have limited ability to implement local policies in addition or in lieu of mayors’. This would
explain the null result in column 3 of table 1.13. For mayor candidates, it could be that voters
interpret criminal records as the ability to get things done, as documented in Winters and
Weitz-Shapiro (2013) and Pereira and Melo (2015). In any case, this should be an important avenue
for future research.
1.10 Conclusion
This project aims at uncovering the effect of criminal information on candidate performance.
Supplemental to existing literature looking at flagrant electoral fraud and electoral malfeasance in
non or partially democratic regimes, I provide evidence on less known, less understood electoral
practices that can also shape the results of elections. I also suggest that judicial information is an
important factor for voter behavior in addition to other information shortcuts documented in the
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literature (party labels, performance, ethnicity, gender, interest groups, and the media, for example).
I document this information effect in Brazil, one of the largest and highest quality electoral
democracies in the world at the time of the study. Further contributions of this paper are the use of
court documents as data and causal identification using the institutional design of judicial review in
the Brazilian electoral court system.
I find substantial and significant negative effects of criminal information on electoral
performance. Being convicted of an electoral crime reduces the probability of election for mayor and
city council candidates in Brazil by 10.3 percentage points. It also reduces vote share by 12.9
percentage points. These results are robust to a series of checks on the inclusion or exclusion
restriction, and to strategic changes of judge, voter, and candidate behavior. I further find that
voters impose harsher electoral punishment conditional on the severity of the criminal information
disclosed. There is a positive, independent effect of engaging in severe rule-breaking on electoral
performance, but once voters know about this, they hold politicians accountable at the ballot box.
This study is relevant for multiple policy reasons. I offer additional evidence claiming the
existence of a negative relationship between electoral crime information and electoral performance
beyond just corruption. Knowing that voters punish bad behavior, skilled politicians and
policymakers can increase monitoring, detection, and prosecution of electoral crimes as a means of
weeding out low-quality office-seeking candidates. A final implication of this project is a discussion
on the effectiveness of electoral oversight authorities in the first place, a feature shared by other
developing countries such as India, Mexico, and South Africa. While on the one hand they might
prevent low-quality candidates from running, and eventually, being elected, they might
simultaneously create barriers to entry that are detrimental to political competition and to the
democratic process in developing countries.
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1.11 Tables and Figures
Table 1.1: Descriptive Statistics
n Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Age 16,791 46.63 11.28 17 86
Male 16,791 .781 .413 0 1
Political Experience 16,791 .082 .275 0 1
Campaign Expenditures (in R$) 16,791 49,924 458,081 0 4e+07
Convicted at Trial 16,791 .577 .494 0 1
Convicted on Appeal 16,791 .497 .500 0 1
Probability of Election 16,791 .194 .396 0 1
Total Vote Share (in p.p.) 16,791 .082 .161 0 1
Vote Distance to Election Cutoff (in p.p.) 16,791 −.088 .080 −.500 .500
Figure 1.1: Instrument Variables Design








Table 1.2: Electoral Crime Rulings
Appeals Percent
Trial Affirmed Reversed Reversed
Not Convicted 6210 885 12.47
Convicted 7461 2235 23.05
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Table 1.3: First-Stage Regressions
Outcome: Convicted at Trial
(1) (2) (3)
Convicted on Appeal .629∗∗∗ .603∗∗∗ .522∗∗∗
(.006) (.006) (.008)
Individual Controls - Yes Yes
Fixed-Effects - - Yes
Observations 16,791 16,791 16,791
F -stat 11,463.4∗∗∗ 771.81∗∗∗ 11.10∗∗∗
Note: First-Stage regressions here report the correlation between
being convicted at trial and being convicted on appeal for all can-
didates who have had their candidacy challenged under charges
of electoral irregularities. I present results including and ex-
cluding individual politician characteristics; municipal, electoral,
and party fixed-effects; and use robust standard errors. ∗p<0.1;
∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01






























Confidence Intervals: 90% CI 95% CI 99% CI
Table 1.4: Hausman Test of Instrument Strength
Outcome Hausman Statistic p-value Sample
1. Probability of Election 45.03 .000 Full
2. Total Vote Share 374.99 .000 Full
3. Vote Distance to Election Cutoff 253.02 .000 Full
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Table 1.5: The Effect of Electoral Crime on the Probability of Election
Outcome: Probability of Election
OLS OLS OLS IV IV IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Convicted at Trial −.093∗∗∗ −.061∗∗∗ −.063∗∗∗ −.143∗∗∗ −.104∗∗∗ −.103∗∗∗
(.006) (.006) (.008) (.010) (.010) (.013)
Individual Controls - Yes Yes - Yes Yes
Fixed-Effects - - Yes - - Yes
Observations 16,791 16,791 16,791 16,791 16,791 16,791
F -stat 231.52∗∗∗ 45.18∗∗∗ 5.99∗∗∗ 219.91∗∗∗ 45.73∗∗∗ 5.98∗∗∗
Note: The regressions here estimate the effect of being convicted at trial on the probability of
election for all candidates who have had their candidacy challenged under charges of electoral
irregularities. Columns 1 and 4 display models not including individual candidate characteristics;
columns 2 and 5 include age, gender, marital status, education level, political experience, and the
amount spent in their campaign; columns 3 and 6 also include municipal, electoral, and party
fixed-effects. I report robust standard errors for all specifications in this table. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05;
∗∗∗p<0.01
Table 1.6: The Effect of Electoral Crime on the Total Vote Share
Outcome: Total Vote Share (in p.p.)
OLS OLS OLS IV IV IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Convicted on Appeal −.097∗∗∗ −.055∗∗∗ −.075∗∗∗ −.153∗∗∗ −.101∗∗∗ −.129∗∗∗
(.003) (.002) (.003) (.004) (.003) (.005)
Individual Controls - Yes Yes - Yes Yes
Fixed-Effects - - Yes - - Yes
Observations 16,791 16,791 16,791 16,791 16,791 16,791
F -stat 1635.53∗∗∗ 618.08∗∗∗ 7.91∗∗∗ 1591.35∗∗∗ 612.69∗∗∗ 7.67∗∗∗
Note: The regressions here estimate the effect of being convicted at trial on the total vote share for all
candidates who have had their candidacy challenged under charges of electoral irregularities. Columns
1 and 4 display models not including individual candidate characteristics; columns 2 and 5 include age,
gender, marital status, education level, political experience, and the amount spent in their campaign;
columns 3 and 6 also include municipal, electoral, and party fixed-effects. I report robust standard errors
for all specifications in this table. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 1.7: The Effect of Electoral Crimes on the Vote Distance to Election
Outcome: Vote Distance to Election Cutoff (in p.p.)
OLS IV OLS IV
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Convicted at Trial −.005∗∗∗ −.009∗∗∗ −.056∗∗∗ −.141∗∗∗
(.000) (.001) (.013) (.021)
Individual Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed-Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sample City Council City Council Mayor Mayor
Observations 13,415 13,415 3,376 3,376
F -stat 16.68∗∗∗ 16.51∗∗∗ 1.93∗∗∗ 1.83∗∗∗
Note: The regressions here estimate the effect of being convicted at trial on
the distance to the election cutoff for candidates who have had their candidacy
challenged under charges of electoral irregularities. All models include individ-
ual candidate characteristics and municipal, electoral, and party fixed-effects.
Since election rules differ by office type, I split the sample into city council can-
didates (columns 1 and 2) and mayor candidates (columns 3 and 4). I report
robust standard errors for all specifications in this table. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05;
∗∗∗p<0.01
Figure 1.3: Instrument Correlation with Covariates
Vote Distance to Cutoff (City Councilor) Vote Distance to Cutoff (Mayor)
Probability of Election Vote Share
No Covariates Individual Covariates Individual 
 Covariates 
 and Fixed Effects
No Covariates Individual Covariates Individual 
 Covariates 



































Table 1.8: Bounded Estimates from Oster (2019)
(1) (2)
Rmax = 1.3 · R̃ Rmax = 1
βtrial [−0.063,−0.072] [−0.063,−0.081]
βappeals [−0.053,−0.065] [−0.053,−0.075]
Note: This table depicts the bounded estimates for
[β̃, β∗] in the two sets of regressions. β̃ is the coeffi-
cient for each conviction variable in the multivariate
model with individual controls and party, municipal,
and election fixed-effects. β∗ is the bias-adjusted
coefficient for each conviction variable in the same
multivariate model using δ = 1 as the degree of se-
lection on unobservables and under Rmax values on
the top row.
Table 1.9: Heterogeneous Sentencing across Trial and Appeals
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
βtrial βappeals βdifference s.e. t-stat p-value
Elected to Office −.148 −.124 −.024 .053 −.456 .649
Age .003 .001 .001 .002 .731 .465
Male .004 .003 .001 .013 .040 .968
Political Experience −.036 −.068 .032 .090 .361 .718
Campaign Expenditures (in R$) −.044 −.033 −.011 .008 −1.335 .182
Marital Status:
Divorced .057 .039 .017 .035 .495 .621
Legally Divorced .025 .044 −.019 .067 −.286 .775
Single .074 .050 .023 .032 .733 .464
Widowed −.014 −.024 .009 .060 .159 .873
Educational Levels:
Completed ES/MS −.178 −.304 .127 .104 1.216 .224
Incomplete ES/MS −.208 −.308 .100 .158 .633 .527
Can Read and Write −.241 −.326 .086 .234 .366 .714
Completed HS −.185 −.317 .133 .088 1.504 .133
Incomplete HS −.234 −.312 .078 .158 .495 .620
Completed College −.227 −.363 .136 .096 1.411 .158
Incomplete College −.201 −.319 .118 .119 .994 .320
Note: In this table, I report the coefficients of two regressions using the same covariates
on the probability of receiving an unfavorable ruling at trial (column 1) and on appeals
(column 2). I then recover the distributions of the differences in betas and test H0:
βdifference = 0 for all covariates in the regressions (columns 3-6). Robust standard
errors are clustered at the municipal-election pair level (equivalent to the judge-level
error shared by all candidates in one municipality during one election period); party-
fixed effects are included in both regressions but are not reported here.
37


















(1) (2) (3) (4)
Share of Candidacies .015 .276∗∗∗ −.004 .183∗
Invalid at Trial (.009) (.085) (.006) (.083)
Individual Controls - - - -
Fixed-Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 8,950 8,950 5,496 5,496
F -stat 434.2∗∗∗ 1298.9∗∗∗ 145.7∗∗∗ 354.3∗∗∗
Note: The regressions here estimate the effect of the share
of candidates convicted at trial overall the total office vacan-
cies on voter turnout and the number of invalid votes (both
logged). I aggregate observations up to the party and elec-
tion level and control for municipality and election year fixed-
effects. I report robust standard errors, clustered by elections
and municipalities, for all specifications in this table. ∗p<0.1;
∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01




Stage Favorable Unfavorable t-stat p-value
Trial 79,099 35,402 5.79 .000
[7,095] [9,696]
Appeals 71,522 36,001 4.83 .000
[8,445] [8,346]
Unfavorable Ruling Affirmed Reversed t-stat p-value
Trial 39,004 34,324 0.63 0.53
[7,461] [2,235]
Note: This table reports t-tests across different subsamples
of candidates. The number of observations in each group is
reported inside the squared brackets.
Table 1.12: Voter Sophistication and Benefit of Rule-Breaking
ρ1: Severe Violation
ρ1 = 0 ρ1 > 0




1. Violation carries no electoral benefit. 1. Violation helps candidate get elected.
2. Voters impose same penalty for
different electoral violations.
2. Voters impose same penalty for
different electoral violations.
ρ2 < 0
1. Violation carries no electoral benefit. 1. Violation helps candidate get elected.
2. Voters impose harsher electoral
penalties for severe violations.
2. Voters impose harsher electoral
penalties for severe violations.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Convicted at Trial −.062∗∗∗ −.095∗∗∗ −.009∗∗∗ −.189∗∗∗
(.016) (.006) (.001) (.023)
Severe Violation .069∗∗∗ .052∗∗∗ .000 −.040∗∗∗
(.019) (.008) (.001) (.015)
Convicted at Trial −.065∗∗ −.058∗∗∗ .001 .084∗∗∗
× Severe Violation (.027) (.011) (.001) (.029)
Individual Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed-Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 11,095 11,095 9,070 2,025
F -stat 5.92∗∗∗ 8.12∗∗∗ 23.50∗∗∗ 1.62∗∗∗
Note: The regressions here include the severity of the accusation brought
against candidates running for municipal office. I recover the accusations
from court documents and identify ruling type using linear support-vector
machine classification (details in appendix A). In columns 1-4, I report the
coefficients on ruling outcome (row 1), type (row 2), and their interaction
(row 3). All regressions include municipal, electoral, and party fixed-effects.








Multiple studies have documented racial, gender, political ideology, or ethnical biases in
comparative judicial systems. Supplementing this literature, we investigate whether judges rule
cases differently when one of the litigants is a politician. We suggest a theory of power collusion,
according to which judges might use rulings to buy cooperation or threaten members of the other
branches of government. We test this theory using a sample of small claims cases in the state of São
Paulo, Brazil, where no collusion should exist. The results show that litigant politicians experience
a lower probability of winning in court (3.7 percentage points), which could be evidence of
punishment – though we are uncertain whether the punishment comes for the political status of
litigants or other factors that correlate with political power.
Keywords: political economy; illegal behavior and the enforcement of law; economics of
corruption.
JEL classification: D72; K42; P48.
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2.1 Introduction
Suppose a case involving a politician is brought before a fair judge. Assume further that
lawyers are equally skilled and unable to influence the judge one way or another. Under these
simplifying conditions, we can reasonably expect a court decision based on case merits and blind to
the political power of litigants. But is this a realistic depiction of judicial decision-making? Besides
judges’ individual biases, there could exist institutional constraints to a fair trial. In some cases, the
judiciary is not an independent branch of government. In others, de jure independence is not
followed by de facto independence. Under separation of powers, the executive and the legislative
also have some control over the judiciary, and thus judges could strategically adjust their decisions
in exchange for benefits controlled by politicians. In developing countries, where institutional
constraints are stronger, the deviations in justice might even be more pronounced. Surprisingly,
however, there are not many studies measuring judicial favoritism in cases involving politicians in
development settings. This paper fills in the gap by investigating judicial independence when
politicians appear before judges in the Brazilian judiciary system.
In recent years, there has been growing interest in the relationship between judicial
decision-making and politics in developing countries. Departing from cross-country analyses of
judicial independence, recent studies examine the interactions between judges and politicians at the
individual level. Sanchez-Martinez (2017) is a good example of this. In the study, the author
investigates whether defendant employers in Venezuela are more likely to see a favorable outcome if
they are affiliated with Venezuela’s ruling socialist party. He finds that employers sharing party
affiliation with judges are 20 percent more successful at trial. In Lambais and Sigstad (2018), the
authors identify a 50 percent advantage in the win rate at trial for elected versus non-elected
candidates when both are defendants in corruption cases in Brazil. These studies provide evidence
against judicial independence under different institutional settings. This project supplements these
findings by investigating whether favoritism persists in cases where judges and politicians have less
at stake (e.g., small claims cases), testing a theory of power collusion across branches of government.
We suggest that the judiciary might favor politicians in court in exchange for (or in anticipation of)
future benefits controlled by other branches of government.
Besides this theoretical component, this paper makes a series of data analysis contributions to
the literature in law, economics, and politics. In order to measure the effect of politician bias, we
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build a unique dataset of small claims decisions from the São Paulo State Court for all mayor and
city council candidates since 2008. We then apply the methodology in Abrams et al. (2012) to
evaluate whether politicians experience any favoritism in their cases. To further investigate the
relationship between litigant politicians and judges, we employ a regression discontinuity (RD)
strategy comparing decisions across mayor candidates who have barely won and lost a municipal
election in the state. Our goal is to verify whether office-holding causes judges to rule in favor of
mayors. Finally, we implement various machine learning regression algorithms to predict court
outcomes and identify the most critical factors driving bias. To our knowledge, this is the first paper
proposing such comprehensive analysis of judicial favoritism of politicians in developing countries.
We find that state court judges rule relatively and significantly less in favor of politicians in
small claims cases than not. Litigant politicians experience a 3.7 percentage point lower probability
of winning. Contrary to our expectation, this result suggests that judges use court decisions as a
power move to warn politicians and force their cooperation. In the regression discontinuity analysis,
we find no difference in rulings for mayor candidates who barely win or lose a municipal election.
We identify a positive correlation between vote share and favorable court outcomes, but as we
narrow in on smaller vote margins, which suggest more competitive elections, the effect of holding
office becomes statistically insignificant at the five percent level. Though this result might seem
surprising, we believe it is a direct consequence of the structure of local governments in Brazil. Since
municipal governments are responsible for implementing high-salience policy, such as health and
primary education, mayor candidates enjoy high visibility and might see favorable outcomes even if
they do not take up office. In the court outcome prediction exercise, we lastly find that claim
amount, judge tenure, pay, defendant politicians, and politician vote share are among the most
important factors in judicial decision-making, consistent with indicative evidence from previous
studies and with the collusion argument developed here.
These results supplement the empirical legal studies literature in multiple ways. First, we
document judicial bias where there should be none. Small claims cases have limited political
consequences such that judges would have the most freedom to exercise independence without
external pressure. Bias in these cases, however, indicates further deviations of justice in the state
court of São Paulo. As the political relevance of cases increases, such as criminal cases, we would
expect politicians to respond accordingly and increase pressure on judges for favorable decisions.
42
Since elections and state court systems are relatively uniform in Brazil, we believe this would be the
norm for other state courts across the country. By presenting evidence of critical factors driving
judicial decisions, we also provide a benchmark for future analysis of politician bias. The amount
claimed in court, judge tenure, judge pay, defendant politicians, and politician vote share are the
primary factors for judicial decision-making and should be the subject of further investigation.
These factors are also first-order issues to be brought to the attention of judges as potential sources
of bias, and should significantly help improve state court systems going forward.
The remainder of this paper is as follows. Section 2.2 discusses the theoretical framework
behind judicial favoritism and previous evidence; section 2.3 presents the institutional design of the
court system in Brazil. Section 2.4 summarizes the dataset used for analysis; section 2.5 discusses
the analytical strategy and presents results. We conclude in section 2.6.
2.2 Motivating Judicial Favoritism of Politicians
Assume there are three representative public agents, one for each branch of government: the
executive, the legislative, and the judiciary. Though these agents are independent, they interact
with one another over time. The executive agent serves on one or two four-year mandates (pending
reelection at the end of the first term). They control the majority of government budgets, and have
the discretion to set wages and allocate resources to the other branches. The legislative agent serves
on a two or four-year period,1 but their mandate is renewable as many times as they are re-elected;
there is no term limit. They are responsible for passing law and determining budget levels but not
its composition. In other words, they approve the amount of money available for other branches of
government but do not have a say on how to spend the money. The judiciary agent serves on
life-long mandates and yields power in restrictive but steady ways. They have limited control over
resources as they only oversee budgets in the courts at which they serve, but resolve disputes
between the other two branches of government and other economic agents (individuals, companies,
etc). In this simplified model, the judiciary interacts with the executive and legislative by settling
their disputes.
1Political mandates have different lengths across political regimes, but these differences do not change the theoretical
predictions in this study.
43
We are interested in the behavior of the judiciary with respect to other branches of government.
Power collusion could exist if the judiciary were using sentences to please the executive and
legislative as a means of buying out those who make the calls on judiciary resources. Under this
hypothesis, the representative judiciary agent derives utility in each period t according to equation
(2.1), which describes the benefit f as a function of k observable characteristics
∑k
x=1 xk, such as
their time in post, their wages, their working conditions, and unobservable characteristics ε, such as
reputation and their happiness in serving justice; costs c are a function of mt working conditions,
executive and legislative utilities ute and utl ; δt are exogenous, stochastic shocks that impact judicial
work. These per-period utilities (indexed by t) are computed in perpetuity (discount factor r) in























Since the executive and the legislative agents have primary responsibility over government
budget, we can expect the judiciary to strategically maximize future net benefit by pleasing other
agents. If the executive and the legislative agents are less likely to lose court cases, their utility
increases. This incentive, however, is not uniformly distributed across all types of judicial cases.
Because electoral, political, and even legal costs are higher in high-salience cases, such as corruption,
politicians expect more favoritism in such cases than in low-salience cases. This makes small claims
cases, which are one example of relatively less important court cases, an ideal subject for judicial
independence research. Any sign of favoritism in these cases is likely carried over to high profile
cases, indicating a widespread deviation of justice. In addition, small claims cases are more
homogeneous, and suffer less from unobservable factors which could drive court outcomes. In the
majority of cases, attorneys have limited ability to influence a case outcome, defendants pay a small
monetary compensation if they lose in court, and the duration of cases is shorter than in other
courts. In other words, these cases are less likely to suffer from unobservable heterogeneity, such
that we can more accurately test whether ∂utj/∂u
t
e, l = 0.
2.2.1 Previous Evidence on Judicial Bias
A key principle of liberal democracies is separation of powers. It creates mechanisms of checks
and balances aiming at preserving individual liberties and avoiding abuse of government power
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against its citizens (Persson et al., 1997; La Porta et al., 2004). An important issue in the literature
is whether courts are independent, and if an independent judiciary improves social, political, and
economic outcomes. The ability to turn rights and principles into social welfare is a fundamental
element for the support of political regimes. In fact, much of the backlash against liberal
democracies in recent years is the result of policies that fail to address increasing disparities in social
conditions across the world. Judicial independence, however, is not driving the disbelief in
democracy: there is documentation of its positive impact on growth (Voigt et al., 2015); on the
enforcement of contracts and the protection of private property (Acemoglu and Johnson, 2005); on
the control of the bureaucracy (McCubbins and Rodriguez, 2009; Hanssen, 2000); on alternation of
power (Ramseyer, 1994); and even on the duration of public policy (Hanssen, 2004).
To fully capture the relationship between judicial independence and social outcomes, a few
recent studies have shifted to a disaggregated, individual-level analysis of judicial bias. These
studies focus on ethnicity, race, gender, or religion bias (Abrams et al., 2012; Shayo and Zussman,
2011; Arnold et al., 2018, and many others), but there are only a few tests on the political status of
litigants:2 Helmke (2002) documents strategic defection of judges in their rulings in Argentina when
governments are weak; Sanchez-Martinez (2017) looks at favoritism of defendant government
agencies in Venezuela when the agency head is a member of the ruling socialist party; Lambais and
Sigstad (2018) examine bias in corruption cases against politicians in Brazil; Poblete-Cazenave
(2019) investigates whether office-holding impacts court outcomes using a sample of state legislators
in India. In line with these studies, we also analyze political favoritism at the individual level, using
litigation data from São Paulo, Brazil. However, we extend these studies by testing for bias in cases
in which politicians are plaintiffs – in addition to cases in which they are defendants. The limitation
of other individual-level studies is only investigating the behavior of judges in cases filed against but
not by politicians. This distinction is relevant if there is any selective litigation (Priest and Klein,
1984; Waldfogel, 1995), in which case we can reasonably expect heterogeneous favoritism effects
conditional on politicians being plaintiffs or defendants. Secondly, we look at low-salience cases,
2There are similarly interesting studies investigating the impact of judiciary efficiency on development (Chemin,
2009) and criminal politicians on social welfare (Chemin, 2012), but these studies do not measure politician bias in
the judiciary.
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where no favoritism is expected. The reasoning is straightforward: since stakes are lower in less
relevant cases, we would anticipate more judicial independence. Any bias in these cases would carry
over to more salient cases (e.g., corruption) because their higher cost makes politicians more wary
and likely to further pressure the judiciary to rule in their favor. Therefore, the evidence here
advances our knowledge on bias in different types of litigation.
2.3 Court Systems in Brazil
Brazil’s judiciary system is divided into general and limited jurisdiction courts. Federal and
State Courts form the general system and Electoral, Military, and Labor Courts form the limited
jurisdiction system. There are up to three instances of judicial review in either system, and the court
of last resort is the Federal Supreme Court (STF). It takes up cases under its jurisdiction as set out
by the Brazilian Constitution, cases in which there are conflicting norms or jurisprudence issued by
lower courts, and cases where there is a direct violation of constitutional norms. To limit the sources
of heterogeneity, this paper focuses on cases heard in state court systems. In particular, we focus on
the state of São Paulo, the most economically and politically important state in the country.
There are 319 judicial districts in the state, and each district has one or more courthouses.
These courthouses host at least one judge with either a broad mandate, meaning that they can rule
on any issue within the state court system’s attribution, or a narrow mandate, which means they
only oversee certain types of cases within the system, e.g., commercial or family law. Within the
state system, there are specialized small claims courts called Juizados Especiais Cíveis (Special Civil
Tribunals, in free translation, and SCTs henceforth). SCTs replaced the primary small claims courts
across Brazil upon the passage of the most recent Brazilian Constitution in 1988.3 Their goal is to
simplify and increase access to justice across states by removing many procedural requirements
present in other litigation systems. SCTs are the primary judicial body for low-complexity cases,
defined as cases in which claims do not exceed 40x the minimum wage.4 The legal issues they take
up range from lease breach, consumer rights, and debt to executions and torts. There is no need for
3More evidence of this in Lichand and Soares (2014).
4There are no state minimum wages in Brazil, so this is the federal, nationwide minimum wage of R$ 1,040 per
month beginning in 2020. This makes the maximum claim amount R$ 41,600, or ∼$9,900 in current dollars using the
2019 end-of-year exchange rate.
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hiring an attorney if claims are under 20x the minimum wage. SCTs are only open to individual or
small company plaintiffs.
An example helps illustrate a typical SCT case. Suppose your mobile phone service provider
has been overbilling you for international phone calls that were never made. You, unfortunately,
could not resolve this issue with the company’s customer service and now want to take legal action
and receive financial compensation for the wrongful charges. You walk up to an SCT office, speak to
a courthouse clerk, and file your claim along with any supporting documentation. The clerk then
provides a court date for a conciliation hearing. At the hearing, you and the phone company will try
to reach an agreement; if that fails, the judge sets trial for either later that same day or in the
following days. At trial, the judge issues a sentence which can be appealed within ten days; on
appeal, a three-judge panel then issues the final ruling. This entire process might take less than
three months, representing a substantial improvement when compared to cases in the regular
judicial process at state courts, which take up to 38 months on average to conclude (CNJ, 2018).
SCT’s structure dramatically reduces the number of dimensions driving judicial decisions.
According to the São Paulo State Court website, there are less than 15 types of cases that can be
brought before SCTs (B.1). It is then easier for judges and lawyers, when hired by the litigants, to
specialize and reduce any skill discrepancy that could substantially drive a case outcome. The
settlement rate is about 4 percent higher in SCTs (CNJ, 2018) compared to all other court systems.
The sentence is also standard across cases: the defendant pays the claim amount if they lose or the
case is dismissed if they win. The standard and relative low-salience punishment removes additional
sources of heterogeneity from high-profile cases, such as corruption cases in Lambais and Sigstad
(2018) or violent crimes in Lim et al. (2015). Small claims cases do not attract as much media
attention as corruption or violent crime, for instance. In fact, the use of these cases is an approach
first introduced by Shayo and Zussman (2011) that takes advantage of the relative homogeneity of
small claims in Israel to isolate the effect of ethnicity and religion on court outcomes. Lastly, judges
have no control over which SCT cases they take. In single-judge courthouses, all cases are presented
before the same judge; in multiple-judge courthouses, the cases are randomly distributed to judges
serving on the same SCT. These distribution rules reduce the sources of external variability of
outcomes and prevent cases from being differently assigned to systematically more lenient (or
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harsher) judges in the state system.5
2.4 Data
We construct a case-level dataset (5,224 observations) with information from two sources. First,
we collect SCT case and judge information from the São Paulo State Court (TJ-SP). The court
publishes all judicial decisions on their website, and the available information is the case duration,
type (e.g. breach of contract, debt execution, and others listed in appendix B.1), the court where it
was filed, ruling judge, the claim amount, litigants and their lawyers (if hired), and sentencing
documents. Second, we use the information on politicians running for municipal office in the state of
São Paulo in 2008, 2012, and 2016 from the Brazilian Electoral Court (TSE). TSE has jurisdiction
over the entire electoral process in Brazil, from registering candidacies, ruling over breach of
electoral law, and overseeing the voting process on election day, to counting votes and authorizing
that elected politicians take up office. It collects individual-level data on politicians and publishes
everything online. We use TSE electoral results, politician information, and electoral district data
for every politician in the state of São Paulo in the municipal elections of 2008, 2012, and 2016.
Table 2.1 contains the descriptive statistics of the sample.
Though the targeted case duration is three months, we can see that cases will last on average
361 days to conclude (12 months), and the average amount claimed by plaintiffs is R$11,750
(∼US$2,790). In 64.5 percent of the cases, judges rule in favor of politicians. Sixty-one percent of
judges are male and have held their position for over ten years. Their income is R$35,152 per
month, or US$8,370, on average. The average age of politicians involved in SCT cases in the state is
44 years old, 90.1 percent are male, and 24.3 percent have previous political experience, measured by
an indicator variable for politicians who have been re-elected or have declared their occupation to
the Electoral Court as politician of any kind (city councilor, mayor, governor, member of Congress,
senator, president). Forty percent of the politicians in our sample were holding office at the time
these cases were heard by the state court. On average, they spent R$18,212 (US$4,336) on the
campaign trail. We have also collected categorical variables for educational attainment and marital
5Yet, for robustness purposes, we replicate the process in Abrams et al. (2012) producing random distributions of
court outcomes to serve as a check on the quality of the case assignment system implemented by the state of São Paulo.
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status for all elected officials, but they are omitted from the table. The most frequent educational
level and marital status are a four-year college degree or equivalent (41.2 percent) and married (70.3
percent), respectively.
2.5 Empirical Analysis
We analyze judicial favoritism in five steps. We start off by confirming random assignment of
cases. Next, we test whether the distribution of rulings in favor of politicians resembles a random
distribution of court rulings. Any deviation would indicate judges do vary how they try cases having
politicians as litigants. Third, we estimate the causal effect of holding office using a regression
discontinuity design. This result is supplemental to judicial favoritism because it allows us to check
heterogeneous effects for those who run for office and those who run and take up office. Step four is
checking bias results against a sample of similar small claims cases, decided by the same judges
around the same time, but whose litigants are not politicians. Our goal is to provide a
counterfactual estimate of judicial outcomes in the absence of litigant politicians. Finally, we use
four machine learning algorithms to predict court outcomes and recover the most critical factors
driving judges’ decisions in SCT cases.
2.5.1 Are Cases Assigned at Random?
To reasonably compare court outcomes across judges, our first concern is establishing that
judges cannot select into cases they try. The design of the Brazilian state court system in general
and SCTs in particular is the first guarantee in support of random assignment of cases. First,
plaintiffs file small claims where the wrongful act took place or where they (or the defendant) live.
Judges do not choose whether to hear the case. Plaintiffs walk up to the court, speak to clerks, and
are instructed on how to proceed. State judges come in only when the case has been opened by
clerks and cannot choose which of the open cases to try. Second, in districts where there is more
than one judge trying cases, the allocation of lawsuits by judge is random; the distribution of cases
across judges happens immediately after the case has been included in the caseload management
system. Together, these two legal features indicate limited, if any, control of case allocation across
judges.
Nevertheless, we provide empirical support to random case assignment. We follow the strategy
in Abrams et al. (2012), who analyze racial bias in felony cases sentencing across judges in Cook
County, IL. They suggest that random assignment could be tested regressing a case characteristic
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λc + εijc (2.2)
Where Ageijc is the politician age, xk are k control variables, Dn is a matrix of n judge
fixed-effects, λc is a matrix of court fixed-effects, and subscripts i, j, c are indexing case i, judge j,
and court c. Under random assignment, the F -test on the joint distribution of judge fixed-effects
should fail to reject the null (i.e., fixed-effects have the same effect on politician’s age). In other
words, it means that there is no substantial correlation between judge fixed-effects and age that
would indicate systematic assignment of cases for politicians of a certain age to any judge. However,
this direct F -test would likely lead to overrejection of the null as described by Abrams et al. (2012).
Since the number of judges per SCT court and the number of cases per judge are relatively small
(an average of 1.74 judges per court and 10 cases per judge), this F -test would not meet the
asymptotic properties of the F -statistic. It would suffer from finite-sample bias (the judge
variability within courts is small), and thus we would be rejecting the null effect of judge
fixed-effects for the data-generating process rather than for a true effect.
The solution to the overrejection problem is the construction of simulated datasets where the
assignment of cases is indeed random and the subsequent comparison of statistical moments in the
empirical distribution versus the simulated moments. Since the data-generating process is random
by construction, the F -statistic unequivocally provides evidence of true judge fixed-effects. This
exercise is as follows. First, the researcher should group the actual (empirical) sample into the
randomization units, which are the clusters within which the distribution of cases is random. In this
study, these units are the SCT courts, which have one or more judges on the bench. The researcher
then recreates the distribution of cases within the unit by randomly drawing, with replacement,
cases from the unit and reassigning them across judges. This process creates a simulated (random)
sample of cases mirroring the empirical sample. An example helps further illustrate this point.
Suppose four judges heard 20 cases (five each) in a given SCT in the state of São Paulo. Each case
has a set of observed characteristics, e.g., plaintiff gender, age, claim type, claim amount, whether
the politician was the plaintiff or defendant, and so on. The researcher then creates 20 simulated
cases, five per judge, keeping the same proportion as in the original data, where each case
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characteristic is randomly drawn from the sample of 20 observed cases. Once this process is
replicated for all randomization units (SCTs), a simulated dataset of the same size as the empirical
dataset has been created. We finally repeat this process to create 1,000 simulated datasets.
Armed with these datasets, we compare the statistical moments in the empirical and simulated
datasets without fearing overrejection. Similarly to Abrams et al. (2012), we compute the means of
politician age for all cases tried by any judge and compute the 25-75 interquartile range (IQR) of
age means for the entire distribution of judges. We report the results in figure 2.1. The empirical
IQR for mean age is 7.75. This value summarizes the average difference in politician age for the
middle 50 percent of cases across all judges. If this empirical moment is not statistically different
from a simulated distribution of politician age IQR, then there is evidence in support of the random
allocation of cases – which is what we expect from the design of SCTs in São Paulo. In figure 2.1,
the p-value for an IQR of 7.75 in the simulated distribution is .072, such that we indeed find support
for random assignment at the five percent level. Though one could claim that .072 is very close to
the .05 threshold, the small number of cases per judge restricts our ability to increase the variance
of case characteristics within each randomization unit. Our average pool for randomizing case
characteristics is small (10 cases per judge) compared to Abrams et al. (2012) (489 cases per judge).
Therefore, small increments in cases per judge would substantially increase variance, shifting the
empirical realization of IQR to the right, to a higher p-value. If anything, the empirical IQR p-value
remains underestimated, lending support to random assignment of cases in São Paulo’s SCTs.
2.5.2 Heterogeneous Convictions Across Judges
To measure judicial favoritism, we carry out a similar process. We produce the same simulated
datasets and IQRs, but instead of looking at the distribution of a case covariate, we examine the
distribution of the outcome of interest, i.e., whether the case has been ruled in favor of a politician.
We present the results in figure 2.2, where we plot the simulated IQR range across all judges in gray.
These judges vary in the harshness with which they rule cases involving politicians. The IQR can
thus be interpreted as the difference in politician win probability across the harsh-lenient judge
spectrum. In the simulated data, this harshness distance is 50.3 percentage points. It means that if
a politician’s case were shifted away from a harsh (lenient) judge, their win probability should have
increased (decreased) by 50.3 percentage points. We expected this simulated result: a uniform
distribution of rulings predicts the 25 percent harshest (most lenient) judges trying in favor
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(against) of politicians 25 percent of the times. The 50 percent in the middle of the harshness
spectrum is the simulated IQR.
The empirical IQR, however, is 38.5 percentage points. This distance between the more strict
and more lenient judges is statistically different (p-value = .0001), and smaller, than the simulated
IQR. There is less variation in court outcomes in the empirical data when compared to the simulated
data, which means that the distribution of court outcomes for litigant politicians is not random.
Judges at the tails of the empirical distribution do not rule as expected. However, we do not know
the direction of the court decisions, whether judges’ are handing out harsher or more lenient rulings.
In other words, it means we still need to answer whether these systematic decisions are in favor or
against politicians. To answer this question, we examine the politician win rate, rather than the
IQR, across all 514 judges in our sample. The results are presented in figure 2.3, where we run the
same simulation exercise and compare the empirical distribution of pro-politician decisions against a
simulated distribution of pro-politician decisions. We use the same process as before to reflect judges’
heterogeneous harshness preferences, in which we draw outcomes for each judge from the same
randomization units (the SCT courts). In figure 2.3, we plot a empirical win rate of 60.8 percent of
all cases against the distribution of simulated win rates (mean = 64.5 percent; standard deviation
= .006). Thus, we document a 3.7 percentage point lower win rate for politicians compared to
simulated win rates. This result is evidence of systematic punishment of politicians in SCT court.
Contrary to our expectation, state judges do not favor politicians in anticipation of future
benefits. Indeed, they are harder than expected on politicians. A potential explanation for this
result is that these unfavorable decisions are judicial demonstrations of power. Judges punish
politicians in these low-salience cases as warning signs of future hostility in case politicians pass on
their judicial benefits. The judiciary is still using decisions as means of extracting benefits, but
rather than using a carrot (favorable decisions), they are using a stick (unfavorable decisions) to
keep politician behavior in check. Unfortunately, we cannot test this mechanism further unless we
have more data on judicial decisions and the involvement of politicians in court cases. An additional
limitation is that we cannot point to individual political factors driving judicial decisions. Though
we find bias against politicians, we cannot know with certainty whether it is political power,
connections, or threats that are underlying the politician bias. This limitation motivates the
exploratory analysis in the following sections.
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2.5.3 Does Holding Office Matter?
In addition to the negative effect documented above, an interesting question is whether judges
respond differently to politicians who are holding office at the time of trial. Since office-holding
politicians yield more power compared to politicians seeking office because the former are effectively
making policy decisions, a plausible hypothesis is that judges would target elected politicians more
often. The ideal experiment to answer this question would be to randomly assign office across
politicians involved in court cases and compare their outcomes. We would be able to compare how
elected officials fare against non-elected officials and pin down the exact bias in favor or against
office-holders. For ethical reasons, however, this is an unrealistic experiment, and the regression
discontinuity design we adopt in this paper is its best approximation yet.
We start by subsetting our sample to only include mayor candidates. They face each other off
in majoritarian elections, and the candidate who reaches 50 percent plus one of the votes is elected
to office. This design allows us to compute the vote share for each mayor candidate and compare
them to the 50 percent threshold: politicians elected to office with narrow margins approximate
random sorting to office when compared to politicians who barely lost their election. Vote margin is
the running variable for a standard regression discontinuity design where the treatment condition is
holding elected office at the time of trial. Lee (2008) inaugurated this research approach, and there
are many studies that adopt such strategy to measure social, political, or economic outcomes in
Brazil (Brollo and Nannicini, 2012; De Magalhaes, 2015; Brollo and Troiano, 2016, and many
others).6 Formally, we estimate the following equation:
y = α+ γ1(x− c) + γ2(x− c)2 + ρ1(x ≥ c) + ρ2(x− c)(x ≥ c) + ε (2.3)
Where y is whether the politician has received a favorable SCT ruling; (x− c) is the vote share
centered at 50 percent, and the squared term captures decreasing returns to scale in vote share;
(x ≥ c) is the treatment indicator variable, i.e., whether the candidate has been elected; the
6Though there has been some pushback against using vote share as the running variable in regression discontinuity
designs, Eggers et al. (2015) show that these claims are concentrated in a selected sample of U.S. House elections and
that there is no evidence of manipulation in Brazilian municipal elections.
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interaction (x− c)(x ≥ c) summarizes differential trends on both sides of the vote share threshold.
Using the bandwidth selection model from Calonico et al. (2015), ρ1 represents the (plausibly)
causal effect of holding office on SCT ruling. Figure 2.4 plots the results of equation 2.3 using the
optimal bandwidth of 8.4 percentage points. Though there seems to exist a positive correlation
between holding office and favorable SCT rulings, the causal estimate is not significant at p-value
= .05. Mayor candidates who barely won or lost an election seem to perform equally well in court.
We force a discontinuity at vote margin zero to make the causal effect explicit, but the potential
causal impact is just masking the non-linear relationship between x (vote margin) and y (court
ruling). The dashed line depicts the polynomial regression on the entire sample and serves as
evidence of this non-linearity.
Figure 2.5 presents a more detailed picture of the relationship between politicians and judges in
court cases. We re-estimate equation 2.3 using different bandwidth sizes (as suggested by Lee and
Lemieux, 2010, and others), which are reported on the x -axis. The Calonico et al. (2015) optimal
bandwidth is again 8.4 percentage points (in blue). The y-axis displays the point estimates and 95
percent confidence intervals for ρ1 in each regression equation. The results confirm a positive and
significant relationship (at p-value = .05) between vote share and favorable court outcomes across
the wider bandwidths (40 through 15-percentage point margins). However, since the significant
effect is only present in larger bandwidths, and candidates in these vote margins are not likely
comparable to each other, we cannot conclude this effect is causal. As we narrow in on smaller
margins, the election coefficient becomes insignificant.7
Though not causal,8 there is evidence of a positive and significant association between vote
margin and SCT outcome. A straightforward explanation to the null effect is the visibility of mayors
in Brazil. Since municipal governments are in charge of health and education policies, mayor
7Despite the larger causal effect at the smallest margin (1 percentage point), the small sample size prevents us from
making stronger inference claims about the relationship between holding office and seeing a favorable result in court.
8We also find null causal effects using difference-in-differences as an alternative identification strategy. We use an
indicator variable for trial decision issued after previous election (time variable) and another for when politicians were
elected to office (treatment variable). Their interaction, i.e., the causal estimate, is null regardless of the model we
estimate (including or excluding covariates and fixed-effects). These models and their results are available upon
request.
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candidates are well-known local figures (much more important than counterparts in U.S. local
elections). Politicians run for office multiple times and could be perceived as politically important
even when they are not in office. This visibility would explain why office might not matter for court
outcomes. Additionally, though the positive correlation here might seem at odds with the negative
bias in section 2.5.2, we note that the sample used for the causal test in this section is only
composed of mayor candidates. The original sample contains individuals running for both mayor
and city council seats. It seems possible that judges adjust their decision-making conditional on
these power differences across politicians, and that city council candidates are punished more
harshly. Unfortunately, we cannot perform the simulation exercise on the mayor-only sample due to
the small number of observations in this group (n = 489). We would run an even higher risk of
overrejecting the null than before.
2.5.4 Comparing Politician vs. Non-politician Rulings
An important concern with our results is the extent to which our sample is representative of
the universe of decisions handed out by SCT judges in the State of São Paulo. If there is any
selection into certain SCT courts, then we might be incorrectly estimating the true win probability
for politicians. For instance, state judges serving at selected courts in our sample might be naturally
harsher, or have a lesser opinion of politicians, and thus the outcomes we observe reflect a single,
biased draw from the distribution of SCT courts across the state. The results would not be
externally valid.
To address these concerns, we recreate the analysis in section 2.5.2 using another sample of
small claims cases, decided by the same judges around the same time, but whose litigants are not
politicians. Except for the absence of litigant politicians, these cases share all other characteristics
with the primary sample. We construct this sample using the unique identification number assigned
to all court cases, in all states, as required by law in Brazil. This case ID is a sequence of 20 digits
structured as follows: the case filing order (7 digits), a control sequence (2 digits), the filing year (4
digits), the court system identifier (3 digits), and a district courthouse identifier (4 digits).9 To
9A courthouse identifier (fórum) is the building where the courts are physically installed. In the state of São Paulo,
the majority of judicial districts have just one fórum. Hence, the last four digits almost always also identifies the
judicial district. The exceptions to this rule are the biggest judicial districts, such as the cities of São Paulo and
Campinas.
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construct the counterfactual sample, we marginally change the filing digits to recover lawsuits filed
immediately before and after every politician case, but which were still decided by the same judge at
the same time. In other words, we add and subtract one to each filing sequence, keeping all other
digits the same, and use these new case IDs to find lawsuits and their information at the São Paulo
state court website. Table 2.2 displays a sample ID from the politician sample: case 3002615 was
filed in 2013 at court system 8, state 26, district 0510. In this case, the IDs for constructing the
counterfactual sample are 3002614–95.2013.8.26.0510 and 3002616–65.2013.8.26.0510.10 Since our
primary sample has 5,224 observations, we recover 10,448 potential lawsuits to serve as
counterfactual units. After excluding invalid IDs, lawsuits for which there is no information
available online, and non-SCT cases tried at the same judicial district as SCT cases, our final
counterfactual sample contains 3,233 cases.
Table 2.3 displays descriptive statistics of the counterfactual sample (panel A) and the tests for
mean differences across original and counterfactual sample (panel B). To compare across groups, we
keep the same variables except for the court outcome measure. Since there are no politicians in the
alternative sample, we cannot compare pro-politician rulings. The percentage of cases ruled in favor
of claimants or defendants, however, can be calculated and compared across samples. We proceed
with the former. Panel B shows significant differences (at p-value = .05) for case claim amount and
the share of claimant win, but no differences in judge characteristics across samples. These
case-level variables, however, ignore shared variation across due to judges trying multiple cases at a
judicial district. We thus suggest measuring outcomes at the judge level, computing average win
rates for all judges in the sample. The results of this exercise are presented in table 2.4. When win
rates are computed across judges, disregarding litigant status, we observe no significant difference
between the politician and the non-politician samples in rows one and two (p-value = .538 for
claimant win rate comparison; p-value = .515 for defendant win rate comparison). Therefore, we are
confident that the politician sample is representative of SCT litigation in São Paulo.
10The control sequence changes but its calculation is public, so we reverse-engineer these two digits for all cases.
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Do Politicians Experience Worse Outcomes as Claimants or Defendants? In section
2.5.2, we document a negative bias against politicians in small claims court decisions. Compared to
simulated rulings, we would expect a 3.7 percentage point increase in their win probability if there
were no judge fixed-effects. Using the alternative sample of non-politician litigants, we can
investigate this effect further. In particular, we want to know if the negative bias has different
magnitudes if politicians are claimants or defendants. Previous evidence in judicial favoritism of
politicians only focused on cases of defendant politicians.
We do this by comparing win rates for claimants and defendants across the two samples. First,
we benchmark win rates by ignoring the status of litigants. Then, we calculate win rates for litigants
in the main sample conditioning their means on their politician status. We present the evidence in
rows three and four of table 2.4. There are no differences between win rates of claimant politicians
and any of the other claimants (p-value = .169). Politician win rate of 72.9 percent is not
significantly different than the 75 percent for other claimants. However, in the last row, we
document defendant politicians experiencing more losses than other defendants. The win rate for
defendant politicians is 21.6 percent of all their cases, while defendants in the alternative sample win
24.9 percent of the times. The difference is significant at p-value = .10. The worse performance of
3.3 percentage points accounts for almost all the magnitude of the negative bias (3.7 percentage
points) in section 2.5.4. This evidence is consistent with other studies. Lambais and Sigstad (2018)
document a 50 percent decrease in win probability when defendant politicians lose elections. Their
effect size is particularly large, but differences in research design and sample composition explain
the smaller effect here. In Lambais and Sigstad (2018), candidates are being prosecuted for
corruption, which is a more salient issue for politicians than the small claims in this study. Second,
Lambais and Sigstad (2018) only measure court outcomes for competitive mayors and city
councilors, those who closely lost or won elections, while we examine court decisions for all
candidates for mayor and city council in the state of São Paulo. Our sample contains less skilled
politicians, who are less likely to influence court outcomes.
2.5.5 Predicting Drivers of Court Outcomes
In the previous sections, we provided evidence against judicial independence in small claims
cases involving politicians in Brazil. Politicians face a 3.7 percentage point lower win rate at trial,
and the majority of the effect (3.3 percentage points) comes from cases in which politicians are
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defendants in SCT court. We want to go beyond court outcomes, however, and examine the drivers
behind judicial decisions in cases involving politicians. Our goal is to identify whether certain
characteristics are better predictors of court rulings, thus informing the sources of the negative bias
against politicians in our analysis.
To this end, we deploy four machine learning (ML) regression algorithms and compare how well
they predict court outcomes. Predictive models have gained ground in the social sciences
(Mullainathan and Spiess, 2017; Athey, 2017, 2019), and we are interested in their ability to point to
individual features (variables) that contribute the most for the prediction of outcomes. Following
standard practice in ML applications, we split the original sample of politician cases into train and
test datasets, using a ratio of 80-20 for the number of observations in each group. The former
portion of the data is used to train the algorithms, within which we apply five-fold cross-validation.
We feed the algorithm the features (covariates) and the labels (outcome) and ask it to predict the
labels based on the features. Once these algorithms have been trained, we repeat the process on the
latter portion of the data, also known as hold-out, so that we can compare prediction performance
across models. Each model will use a different prediction technique, but they will all produce an
accuracy score, which is each model’s percentage of correct predictions over the entire sample. We
also use Cohen’s Kappa scores (Landis and Koch, 1977), which indicate the increment in the rate of
agreement between predicted and observed labels on top of random prediction.
Table 2.5 displays the performance measures for each model used in the analysis. The four
models are (1) Logistic regression with Lasso regularization (Tibshirani, 1996); (2) Random Forest
(Breiman, 2001); (3) Gradient Boosting (Friedman, 2001); and (4) Deep Neural Networks using
dense layers (Goodfellow et al., 2016). The best performing model is Random Forest. It predicts the
correct court outcome in 77 percent of the cases in the hold-out data and performs 19.2 percent
better than a random classifier. What we are interest in, however, is going beyond predictions and
identifying the underlying factors driving judicial decisions. A key feature of Random Forest
regression is that we can verify the most important variables for outcome prediction. Since the
model’s outcomes are decisions made by state judges in São Paulo, we can thus identify the factors
behind judicial decisions as the most important variables in the Random Forest regression. The
most popular variable importance measure is the Mean Decrease in Gini.
The Gini Coefficient of a Random Forest model measures the contribution of each variable to
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the homogeneity of trees’ nodes and leaves. The more homogeneous a tree is, the higher its Gini
Coefficient and the model’s accuracy (prediction). The Mean Decrease in Gini is just the average of
Gini Coefficients for all decision trees used to build the model, and higher values also indicate higher
variable importance. Figure 2.6 shows the variable importance plot based on Mean Decrease in Gini.
The factors on the y-axis are ranked by their score. The most critical factors are amount claimed in
court and judge tenure, followed by judge pay, the status of politicians as defendants, candidates’
vote shares, and age. We are particularly interested in the political variables; unsurprisingly, judges
pay close attention to cases involving defendant politicians, for whom we document the worst
performance in court. We also see that judges respond to candidate’s vote share. This result signals
that decisions in politician cases take into account the relative power of candidates as measured by
their vote count. This evidence is consistent with the model in section 2.2, where we posited that
politicians and judges develop a mutually beneficial relationship; i.e., they collude with one another
when their utility of cooperation is higher than their utility of competition. For instance, ruling in
favor of a politician in an SCT case would create a positive attitude towards increasing resources
available to the judicial branch. Contrary to our expectation, however, the mechanism behind
cooperation is not favorable decisions; in fact, state judges rule against politicians in low-salience
small claims cases, signalling power, to buy cooperation from local politicians.
In addition to Gini, we also present evidence from partial dependency plots (PDP) in figure 2.7.
These graphs depict the distribution of marginal effects of any variable in a Random Forest
regression, allowing us to identify the direction of the effect of each factor on court outcome. PDPs
recover the marginal effect of an explanatory variable xs on the outcome of the model by integrating
x over the range of values for all other covariates X−s. In the case of a linear model, for example, the
PDPs would display a single linear effect. Figure 2.7 displays the PDPs of the four most important
variables detected in the random forest model. The y-axis displays how the probabilities of
politicians winning their SCT cases change with marginal changes on each of the four variables. The
shaded area under the x -axis shows the concentration of observations in the hold-out data at each
value, and larger blocks indicate more observations at a particular level of the explanatory variable.
We analyze marginal effects by looking at the trend for each variable in figure 2.7.
Pro-politician rulings have a downward trend over the range of case claim values. SCT cases whose
claimants are asking for higher compensations are more exposed to unfavorable court rulings. Judge
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tenure is slightly upward-slopping, and serves as an indication that more experienced judges tend to
favor politicians in court. One potential explanation for this relationship is that judges with longer
tenures have also been playing the politician litigation game for longer and have come to realize that
cooperation, rather than punishment, might work best for their interactions with the other branches
of government. This explanation is an interesting avenue for future research. The graphs are less
informative for the effects of judge pay and defendant politicians. Marginal effects for judge pay are
relatively stable over the range of wages, and defendant status unequivocally reduces the probability
of winning a small claims case. This effect was expected, however, since there are only two possible
values for this variable (0 or 1) and small claims cases are noticeably decided in favor of claimants.
2.6 Conclusion
This paper investigates whether there is differential treatment of politicians in small claims
courts in the state of São Paulo, Brazil. To our knowledge, it is the first paper to produce clear
evidence against judicial independence in low-stakes settings. State judges are arguably using
low-salience rulings to signal power to politicians, and perhaps to buy future cooperation if these
politicians take up office. In particular, this behavior occurs in cases where politicians are the
defendants in small claims cases, where they see a 3.3 percentage point lower win rate when
compared to all other defendants.
Similar studies in the literature document a positive bias in court when politicians are
defendants in corruption cases (Lambais and Sigstad, 2018) or when they share the affiliation with
the ruling party (Sanchez-Martinez, 2017; Poblete-Cazenave, 2019). We supplement the literature
by looking at the entire distribution of politicians, even those not holding office at the time of trial,
and focusing on low-salience cases – precisely where there should not exist any bias. Besides the
evidence of judicial bias in cases involving politicians, this project also makes predictions of court
outcomes and pinpoints the most critical factors driving judicial decisions: amount claimed in court,
judge tenure, judge pay, defendant politicians, and politician vote share. Though we only focus on a
small set of cases, those filed in São Paulo’s special civil tribunals, the predictions should serve as a
benchmark for the deviations in other judiciary systems. The majority of studies in the political
economy literature posits that an independent judiciary is crucial for checking the power of the
executive and the legislative, and for supporting economic development (Baland et al., 2010, and
many others). Thus, we hope this study provides valuable insights for policymakers in developing
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countries sharing similar institutional designs.
Future projects should adopt new strategies to identify the causal effect of holding office on
court outcomes. We find a positive correlation for mayor candidates, but we are unable to partial
out potential unobservable biases driving the positive effect. A mayor’s ability, or the experience
they have with state court systems, could simultaneously influence their office prospects and court
outcomes. Thus, we only provide the magnitude of the association between holding office and
pro-politician rulings but make no causal claim about this relationship. Projects identifying the
causal effect or widening the scope to also include the effect for city council candidates would be
great contributions to this literature.
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2.7 Tables and Figures
Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics
n Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Case Level
Case Duration (in days) 5,224 361 433 1 5,416
Amount Claimed (in R$) 5,224 11,750 10,633 35 40,000
Pro-Politician Ruling 5,224 .645 .478 0 1
Judge Level
Male 514 .611 .488 0 1
Tenure (in days) 514 4,385 2,892 13 12,987
Wage (in R$) 514 35,152 10,797 13,156 145,616
Candidate Level
Age 2,943 44 10.3 18 78
Male 2,943 .901 .298 0 1
Political Experience 2,943 .243 .430 0 1
Elected to Office 2,943 .402 .500 0 1
Campaign Expenditures (in R$) 2,943 18,212 77,890 11 1,770,315
Figure 2.1: Interquartile Range of Candidate Age by Judge
IQR = 7.755
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62
Figure 2.2: Interquartile Range of Favorable Ruling by Judge
IQR = .385
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Figure 2.3: Comparison of Politician Win Probabilities Per Judge
Mean = .608
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Figure 2.5: Election Point Estimates (and their 95% CIs)
on Court Outcomes
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Table 2.2: Individual Identifier for Lawsuits in Brazil
3002615–80.2013.8.26.0510

3002615: case filing order
80: control sequence
2013: filing year




Table 2.3: Descriptive Statistics Across Politician and Non-Politician Sample
Panel A: Non-Politician Sample
n Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Case Level
Case Duration (in days) 3,233 353 380 1 3,336
Amount Claimed (in R$) 3,233 9,565 9,631 10 40,000
Claimant Win Rate 3,233 .749 .434 0 1
Judge Level
Male 389 .622 .485 0 1
Tenure (in days) 389 4,297 2,824 64 12,987
Wage (in R$) 389 35,237 11,334 13,156 145,616
Panel B: Mean Difference Across Samples
Mean Mean
Politician Non-politician Mean
Sample Sample Difference t-statistic p-value
(n = 5,224) (n = 3,233)
Case Level
Case Duration (in days) 360 353 7.516 .837 .402
Amount Claimed (in R$) 11,749 9,565 2,184 9.737 .000
Claimant Win Rate .729 .749 -.019 -1.979 .048
Judge Level
Male .611 .622 -.011 -.343 .732
Tenure (in days) 4,384 4,297 87.055 .454 .650
Wage (in R$) 35,151 35,237 -86.074 -.115 .908
Table 2.4: Mean Difference of Outcomes at the Judge-Level
Mean Mean
Politician Non-politician Mean
Sample Sample Difference t-statistic p-value
Any Claimant × Any Claimant .741 .751 −.010 −.616 .538
(n = 514) (n = 389)
Any Defendant × Any Defendant .259 .249 .010 .651 .515
(n = 514) (n = 389)
Politician is Claimant × Any Claimant .729 .751 −.022 −1.377 .169
(n = 483) (n = 389)
Politician is Defendant × Any Defendant .216 .249 −.033 −1.652 .099
(n = 321) (n = 389)
Table 2.5: Performance Measures For All Models
Model Accuracy Kappa
1. Random Forest 76.97% 19.21%
2. Gradient Boosting 74.86% 15.92%
3. Lasso 72.64% 12.49%
4. Deep Neural Networks 67.82% 5.03%
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ACTIVE AND PASSIVE TRANSPARENCY
Summary
Are active and passive transparency policies substitutes or complements? Though multiple
countries simultaneously implement both policies, there are no studies investigating whether they
are stronger together or independently. I address this gap in the literature by developing the first
simultaneous analysis of active (government releases information by action) and passive (government
releases information upon request) transparency policies. Using a unique quasi-experimental,
concurrent implementation of these policies in Brazil, I find that the joint implementation of active
and passive transparency improves municipal human development index (HDI) by 10.7 percentage
points. This result indicates that transparency policies are complements, and are stronger together
in improving social and economic wellbeing.
Keywords: government performance; transparency; accountability; corruption; governance.
JEL classification: D73; K42; P48; H83.
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3.1 Introduction
Institutional scholars often claim that government transparency is a key factor for good
governance and economic development (Kaufmann et al., 1999; Rothstein, 2012). When
governments make their business public, they increase the scrutiny and oversight of actions taken by
elected officials and civil servants. In many countries, for instance, citizens can access expense
reports filed by politicians to verify and demand the proper use of public resources. Institutional
transparency thus creates an accountability mechanism aligning the interests of agents and
principals, further supporting economic and social progress. In this study, I contribute to this
literature by investigating the simultaneous effects of two transparency policies on municipal
governance in Brazil.
At present, transparency analyses suffer from the same overarching limitations of the
institutional scholarship. There is no consensus on what they mean, whether they vary across or
within countries (or both), and how exactly they impact economic and social development (e.g., the
endogenous institutions literature in Acemoglu et al., 2005; Dal Bo et al., 2010). In this study, I
address some of these limitations by disaggregating, defining, and analyzing transparency initiatives.
I investigate the relationship between transparency and governance at the local level, moving beyond
cross-country studies. I break down transparency policies into two categories: active transparency,
defined as action initiated by government to release public information, and passive transparency,
defined as action making information available only upon request. What differentiates each policy is
whether government releases information by action (active) or by request (passive). To date, studies
have been limited either by aggregate measures of transparency or independent analyses of active or
passive transparency. However, these policies are rarely implemented in isolation. Governments
often adopt them as concurrent anti-corruption instruments. Thus, understanding how these policies
interact is a fundamental step for fighting corruption and, consequently, improving governance.
I take advantage of a unique setting in Brazil in which these policies coexisted for about fifteen
years. Between 2003 and 2015, the Office of the Comptroller-General (CGU) implemented a random
audit program investigating the use of federal resources by municipalities across Brazil. This
program is the source of exogenous variation in active transparency across Brazilian municipalities.
In 2012, Brazil also enacted its FOI Act establishing channels of information release across all
government levels. This legislation provides another source of exogenous variation in passive
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transparency when comparing municipal outcomes before and after FOI. By overlaying the two
policies, I artificially create a two-treatment design where municipalities fall into one of four
treatment conditions summarized in figure 3.1: (i) control (unaudited municipalities before FOI);
(ii) passive transparency (unaudited municipalities after FOI); (iii) active transparency (audited
municipalities before FOI); (iv) active and passive transparency (audited municipalities after FOI).1
To analyze the effects of transparency policies, I use performance, development, and sanction
outcomes between 2005 and 2017. I call this the governance experiment because these measures
form a comprehensive picture of the quality of municipal administration in Brazil. They also
contribute a granular, in-depth analysis of institutional quality at the municipal-level, a significant
improvement from country-wide measurements in cross-country studies. The results show that the
joint implementation of active and passive transparency contributes to an improvement of 10.7
percentage points in the municipal human development index (HDI). To put this in perspective, this
much gain in Brazil’s country-wide HDI would move it from 72th to 36th place in the United
Nations’ 2019 Human Development Index Ranking – thus a substantial improvement. There are
other social and economics factors that would prevent this much HDI increase in actuality, but this
result indicates the positive association between more government accountability and HDI – a yet
undiscovered effect. Passive transparency significantly improves all three outcomes, indicating an
overall improvement in institutional quality, while active transparency only improves municipal
administration performance. I explore the mechanisms behind these effects in the results section.
Since these transparency programs also had evaluation components, they allow for two
additional, cross-effects experiments. First, the random audits produced objective measures of
corruption (extensively discussed in Ferraz and Finan, 2008, 2011; Brollo et al., 2013; Zamboni and
Litschig, 2018; Avis et al., 2018), such that I can compare municipalities audited before and after
FOI to measure the effect of passive transparency on corruption (corruption experiment). Second,
CGU also collected objective, FOI compliance measures between 2015 and 2017 for a subset of
municipalities, such that I can compare audited and unaudited municipalities in this subsample to
1This quasi-experimental design is the same as a randomized-controlled trial that follows treatment and control units
over time.
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measure the effect of active transparency on information quality (information experiment). Thus, I
additionally contribute to the literature the analysis of (i) the effects of FOI on corruption and
(ii) the effects of audits on FOI compliance. In the corruption experiment, I show significant
negative effects of passive transparency. Enacting FOI legislation reduces acts of corruption in
public spending by 22.3 percent. These results are not explained by differential corruption trends
over time. In the information experiment, the effect of active transparency is even stronger. Audited
municipalities almost always provide accurate and timely responses to FOI requests. Though only
passive transparency has a consistent, direct effect on governance, both policies have substantial
cross-effects and help prevent corruption and improve accountability mechanisms.
The remaining of this paper is organized as follows: in section 3.2, I discuss the institutional
design that allows for the causal identification of both active and passive transparency effects;
section 3.3 sketches the theoretical mechanisms and hypotheses behind the relationship between
transparency and institutional quality; section 3.4 presents the data; section 3.5 outlines the
empirical strategy, whose results are reported in section 3.6; finally, section 3.7 concludes.
3.2 Transparency Policies in Brazil
Transparency policies are the responsibility of the Brazilian Office of the Comptroller-General
(CGU), which was established in 2003 to oversee the use of federal resources across the country. Its
mission involved investigating and guaranteeing the proper allocation of resources not only across
the federal executive, but also across all levels of executive government – states and municipalities
included. Over time, its attributions expanded from a purely monitoring function to rule-making
and even the imposition of legal sanctions on state and municipal governments, public officials, and
private parties contracted by the Brazilian government. Since its inception, CGU has been the most
important anti-corruption agency in the country and, despite political changes, it has maintained its
high-profile status as an autonomous oversight agency within the federal government.
CGU is responsible for a number of transparency programs. It processes FOI requests at the
federal executive level; it hosts annual conferences on fighting corruption; it works jointly with other
law enforcement (the Federal Police and the Office of the Prosecutor-General) to conduct
investigations on misuse of public resources; and it publishes civil servant wages. These are just a
few of its responsibilities. One of its most recognized programs is the random audit of municipalities,
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which began in 2003 and ended in 2015.2 This program consisted of a short CGU visit, generally a
week or two long, to a municipality for the investigation of the use of federal resources in public
services. The central CGU office provided state teams with a list of inspection orders, covering
transfers from the federal government to municipalities in the previous three to four years. The
state team would check this list against the records provided by municipal officials. After the visit,
auditors summarized their findings in a report which was then made available on CGU’s website
and forwarded to all prosecuting authorities, such as the Federal Police and local legislative
branches, i.e. city councils and state legislative bodies.
The program has been successful since inception. In 2004, CGU fed the Federal Police evidence
of a corruption scheme covering over 100 procurement contracts for the purchase of emergency
vehicles in 119 municipalities between 2000 and 2002, with an estimated loss of $7 million (in 2002
US dollars). In addition, the program’s design has made it a prolific source of academic research.
CGU randomly selected a given number of municipalities in each state and assigned teams of
independent, highly-qualified bureaucrats to scrutinize all expenditures made by municipalities
under each policy program. CGU audits are unbiased. Its officials are tenured civil servants who
have been approved in national competitive exams and whose income is both independent of their
audit findings and higher than the national average for professionals of similar qualification. The
audit reports contain detailed information about the program under investigation, the amount of
funds that should have been spent, what goods or services should have been procured, etc. CGU
officials used a low-medium-high severity scale to classify irregularities in program spending. These
reports have been extensively used in the political science and economics literature, and some
important studies are Ferraz and Finan (2008, 2011); Brollo et al. (2013); Zamboni and Litschig
(2018). Thus, not only the random audit program is an excellent source of unbiased, objective
measures of municipal corruption, but it also constitutes an exogenous shock of active transparency
imposed on a random sample of municipalities starting in 2003.
The second institutional feature making Brazil the perfect case for this research project is the
2The program still exists today but, instead of randomly selecting and auditing municipalities, CGU uses an internal
risk score model to assign audits to municipalities most at risk of corruption.
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passage of its FOI act in 2011, which came into force in May 2012. The law requires that
government offices at all levels, and their affiliated agencies, set up systems of access to public
information. Its provisions are similar to that of other FOIAs across the world: all information is
public unless expressed and justified by the agency responsible for the information; no agency can
charge for use of government data; and any individual or company, national or foreign, can file a
request for data. The nationwide scope, the immediate effect, and the standardized, mandatory
rules established by FOI make it an exogenous and uniform shock of passive transparency across
Brazil starting in May 2012.
While the random audit program both creates an exogenous shock of active transparency and a
rich dataset of objective measures of corruption, the same is not true of FOI – which only imposes
the passive transparency shock. CGU, however, implemented a random evaluation of FOI called
Transparent Brazil Scale (EBT), which is the source for objective measures of FOI compliance. The
EBT evaluation program ran from 2015 to 2017 and aimed at creating a national ranking of the
quality of freedom of information systems across Brazilian states and municipalities. The criteria
behind the ranking form a very detailed, 20-page evaluation guide on many FOI dimensions, ranging
from a check on whether the local government has a functioning website to the actual submission of
dummy information requests. In fact, the latter requests are the key element for the construction of
FOI outcomes. Every year, CGU randomly selected state and municipal governments across the
country and sent them four information requests asking for progress on the implementation of FOI,
and for data on social, education, and health programs. The responses to these information requests
were coded as binary variables indicating FOI compliance, both in terms of information accuracy
and response time. Therefore, I can also construct unbiased, objective FOI compliance measures
using a subset of the data generated by the EBT program, which I detail in section 3.4.3
3Multiple studies have confirmed the quality of CGU programs. Yet, many of the documents detailing the random
audit and the EBT initiatives are available online for further check. For instance, CGU published detailed guides on
randomization strategy and outcome measurement for both programs, an initiative that lends additional support to
the unbiased and thorough evaluation and implmentation of transparency programs.
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3.3 Expected Effect of Transparency
3.3.1 Active Transparency
I define active transparency as any action initiated by government, or its affiliated entities, to
release public information about government business. Top-down monitoring of policies,
governments, and officials are some ways of implementing active transparency. Monitoring can be
anything from setting-up deliberative or investigative committees to auditing instruments. Though I
focus on audits in this study, all of these initiatives aim at increasing the costs of illegal activities,
following the criminal behavior models pioneered by Becker (1968); Becker and Stigler (1974);
Rose-Ackerman (1975). According to these models, criminal behavior is the result of cost-benefit
calculations of engaging in criminal activity; for instance, if governments audit the use of funds and
communicate irregularities to law enforcement, the media, and the public, they increase the costs of
bureaucrats’ illegal action by increasing the probability of crime detection and prosecution.
Therefore, I can plausibly expect that active transparency improves governance, and results in
better government performance, higher human development, and more sanctions imposed for
officials’ misconduct. This reasoning forms hypothesis HA1.
HA1: A municipal government that has experienced an active transparency intervention (audits)
should see an improvement in governance, measured by performance, development, and sanctions
outcomes.
In addition to performance, I expect that audits positively impact FOI compliance. When local
governments welcome a team of auditors and have to go through their program records in order to
answer inspectors’ questions, it is likely that they will learn from experience and improve
information storage in response to increased scrutiny. It is also likely that they will pick up tips and
tricks from federal auditors, who are experts in information retrieval and reporting, such that they
will become more productive in their tasks as a consequence of the audits. Both the time it takes to
process FOI requests and the accuracy with which these requests are reported would see
improvements after an audit has taken place. Hypothesis HA2 captures this relationship.
HA2: A municipal government that has experienced an active transparency intervention (audits)
should see better FOI compliance, measured by how timely and accurate the released information is.
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3.3.2 Passive Transparency
There is no widely-accepted definition of passive transparency as it only recently became the
subject of scholarly interest. To fill in the gap, I propose the definition of passive transparency as
any action initiated by government, or its affiliated entities, in which information is made available
but released only upon request. This definition focuses on the role of the government as responding
to, rather than initiating, a transparency action. In actuality, passive transparency studies have
mostly analyzed freedom of information legislation. FOI laws constitute dormant accountability
measures which are activated when there is an explicit request from the public, the media, or any
other non-governmental agent. An important concern with FOIs is whether they are inherently
positive. As suggested by Prat (2005), transparency can lead to worse social outcomes if agents
conform to a certain behavior that is detrimental to principals. For instance, officials can refrain
from implementing utility-maximizing but risky policies to avoid FOI challenges. An additional
concern comes from the effort required to meet FOI standards. Governments would scramble to
organize their files and make sure all information is available at the expense of their core
responsibilities. If, eventually, these data are not requested by anyone outside government, or if data
are requested but there are no wrongdoings, then passive transparency has consumed resources and
has not produced social benefits.4 Thus, I adopt a skeptical approach and suggest a negative
relationship between passive transparency and both performance and corruption outcomes
(respectively, the main governance experiment and the corruption sub-experiment). These ideas are
presented in hypotheses HP1 and HP2.
HP1: A municipal government that has experienced a passive transparency intervention (under
scrutiny of FOI law) should see worse governance levels, measured by performance, development,
and sanctions outcomes.
4The case where there are benefits of organizing information for active transparency is different in at least two
dimensions. First, the former case is primarily concerned with the use of specific resources instead of all data on
government activities. The benefits of investigating and correcting the use of funds are much more clear than that of
making all municipal normative acts public; second, the costs of releasing information in active transparency are
mostly borne by the external auditing agency.
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HP2: A municipal government that has experienced a passive transparency intervention (under
scrutiny of FOI law) should see worse corruption levels, measured by the number of corruption
irregularities found in federal program spending.
3.3.3 Active and Passive Transparency
The joint treatment of active and passive transparency (also called double transparency in this
study) occurs when a government body has been audited and when FOI is in force. In this case,
government information has been revealed by a monitoring agency and additional information can
be revealed upon request. Since I posited in subsections 3.3.1 and 3.3.2 opposing impact of active
and passive transparency, the expected joint effect is ambiguous. They can partially or entirely
offset each other. Suppose audits reveal corruption and make public officials wary of further
investigations using FOI data. In this case, they can conform to group behavior to avoid risky,
utility-increasing (or to hide utility-decreasing) actions. Active transparency is socially beneficial
but passive transparency is not. The net effect depends on the magnitude of each independent
intervention, and should be calculated empirically (hypothesis HAP).
HAP: The effect of a joint active and passive transparency intervention (audits and FOI law) on
performance, development, and sanctions is ambiguous.
Unfortunately, I do not observe corruption and FOI compliance outcomes for all municipalities
in the sample. These measures are only constructed from randomized evaluations conducted by
CGU on a subsample of municipalities in Brazil. I summarize all hypotheses and expected effects in
table 3.1.
3.4 Data
The data come from various sources and span over multiple years (2005-2017). I construct a
repeated cross-section dataset of Brazilian municipalities with performance, development, sanction,
corruption, and information outcomes. The outcomes are measured at the municipality-year level,
totalling 7,149 observations for 4,316 unique municipalities. The independent variables of interest
are audit (active) treatment, FOI (passive) treatment, and double (active and passive transparency)
treatment. I conduct all analyses with municipal covariates and linear time trends for all years
under study.
I construct the performance, development, and sanctions measures from three sources. The
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performance outcome comes from the statistical profile of municipalities in Brazil, a dataset
published every two or three years by the National Statistics Office (IBGE). One of the information
they collect is whether municipalities have approved, or updated, their municipal urban
development plan (MUDP). These plans lay out land use regulations and zoning laws that support
(structured) spatial growth of municipalities. Since crafting such a plan requires inputs from all
areas of local government, they are good proxies of performance because they indicate whether
governments are good at coordinating efforts to implement policies. I build a dataset of MUDP
adoption (and update) for all waves of the statistical profile published by IBGE and match them to
municipalities included in this study’s sample.
The development outcome comes from industry association FIRJAN, the second largest in the
country. Its research team produces an annual report of municipal human development index (HDI)
for all municipalities in Brazil, closely following the United Nations’ HDI methodology. All
underlying data in its municipal HDI come from the many economic and social research offices
across the Brazilian government, such that there are no concerns about loss in data quality, or bias,
due to FIRJAN being the source of the data. Their HDI methodology is open and indicates data
sources and steps for replication.
Sanctions come from three datasets of law enforcement agencies in Brazil: (i) the Federal
Police-CGU’s dataset on corruption crackdown operations; (ii) CGU’s dataset on enforcement
operations conducted to seize evidence as mandated by judicial proceedings; (iii) National Council
of Justice’s dataset on convictions of public officials for misuse of public office. For all municipalities
in the sample and all years, I construct binary variables on whether the municipality has been the
target of a corruption crackdown operation, whether municipalities have had documents seized as
evidence, and whether any of their public officials has been convicted for misuse of public office. I
then create a binary sanctions variable taking up value one if any of these sanctioning actions has
taken place for any given municipality-year pair.
For corruption outcomes, I use CGU’s random audit evaluation program, which ran until 2015.
I use the same dataset as Avis et al. (2018), which is publicly available online as a response to a
freedom of information request. It contains all inspection orders for municipalities randomly selected
for audit since 2005, which is when CGU developed their standardized, three-level (low, medium,
and high severity) coding of corruption and mismanagement irregularities. Low-severity findings are
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coded as mismanagement; medium and high-severity findings are coded as corruption. Following
Avis et al. (2018), I compute the (logged) count of corruption, mismanagement, and total findings
for each audit. The level of observation is the municipality-lottery pair.5
FOI compliance outcomes come from CGU’s FOI evaluation program (EBT), which ran
between 2015 and 2017. Specifically, I use four dummy information requests sent to municipalities
every year that EBT ran. These requests measured the quality of information on two dimensions:
(i) whether the municipality reported back in the time mandated by FOI; (ii) whether the
information provided was accurate. These requests covered four policy areas: health, education,
social, and transparency programs. For the time dimension, I compute whether the municipality has
responded to any of the four requests within the mandated deadline. For the accuracy dimension, I
compute whether the municipality has provided correct answers to any of the four requests. A
particularly important feature of EBT is that the information requests concerned programs whose
implementation and evaluation were under CGU’s responsibility. This means that CGU kept
program records against which they could compare all FOI responses they received, further
increasing data quality.
Municipal covariates come from the 2010 Census, so they are repeated across observations for
different years. I include the share of urban population, the share of female population, the share of
illiterate population, (logged) income per capita levels, the Gini coefficient, the share of poor
population, whether the municipality hosted a AM radio station, whether the municipal
administration had set up both the health and education participatory councils, and whether the
municipality was the seat of a judiciary branch unit. These variables control for observable
differences in municipal conditions that could bias treatment results. I report their summary
statistics in table 3.2. I show all treatment groups from figure 3.1 but omit the control group. For
each treatment group, I report the group mean, the mean difference against all other groups, and
the p-value of a t-test on the mean difference. In the bottom panel, I indicate which experiment
uses which sample. According to table 3.2, differences across groups are small and statistically
5Between 2006 and 2015, there were between one and three lottery draws per year, which means that the
municipality-lottery pair also fully identifies the year in which the audit took place. Therefore, all observations in our
sample are measured at the municipality-year pair.
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insignificant at p-value = .05. The only exception is the log of income per capita, which is
statistically different across the double treatment, the active treatment, and their respective control
groups. Since this is the only difference across groups, I am not concerned about baseline differences
that would drive the results in this study. Nevertheless, I estimate all regressions controlling for all
covariates to reduce even further the potential for bias in our parameters of interest.
3.5 Empirical Strategy
Though I do not manipulate the research environment, the unique joint implementation of
active and passive transparency policies in Brazil is in many ways similar to a natural experiment.
Audit treatment is randomly assigned across municipalities between 2006 and 2015, allowing for the
experimental evaluation of outcomes across active treatment and control groups. In 2012, the
Brazilian FOI law was enacted nationwide, serving as an exogenous shock of passive transparency
across all municipal governments. Therefore, I can also implement a difference-in-differences
strategy comparing outcomes before and after FOI implementation. I call this analysis the
governance experiment, for which the estimating equation (3.1) is:
yi,j = α+ γ1 · auditi,j + γ2 · FOIi,j + ρ · (auditi,j · FOIi,j)
+ λ1 · (auditi,j · FOIi,j · time) + λ2 · time+Xβ + εi,j
(3.1)
The dependent variable yi,j takes up the performance, development, and sanctions measures for
municipality i in year j; audit is a binary variable indicating if municipality i has been audited in
year j, and γ1 is the active treatment effect; FOI is a binary variable indicating if municipality i is
under FOI law in year j, and γ2 is the passive treatment effect; auditi,j · FOIi,j is the interaction
for joint treatment, whose effect is captured by ρ. λ1, λ2 summarize interactions of joint treatment
and a linear time trend (time) controlling for differential treatment trends over time. I estimate
models including and excluding the Xβ matrix of municipal characteristics described in section 3.4;
finally, εi,j are the unobservable municipal characteristics.
In addition to the governance experiment, I also conduct two additional analyses: the
cross-effects of active (passive) transparency on FOI compliance (corruption) outcomes. These are
the information and corruption sub-experiments, which are made possible because of the
simultaneous implementation of audits and FOI. In the post-FOI (after 2012) period, some
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municipalities were also randomly selected for audits; in the audited sample, some municipalities
were only audited after 2012, when FOI had already been implemented. Figure 3.2 displays the
experiments’ visual representation. In the information experiment (figure 3.2(a)), the additional
treatment is audits; in the corruption experiment (figure 3.2(b)), the additional treatment is FOI.
Their estimating equations are:
FOIcompliancei,j = α+ ρ · auditi,j + λ1 · (auditi,j · time) + λ2 · time+Xβ + εi,j (3.2a)
corruptioni,j = α+ ρ · FOIi,j + λ1 · (FOIi,j · time) + λ2 · time+Xβ + εi,j (3.2b)
Where the dependent variables are respectively FOI compliance and corruption outcomes for
municipality i in year j. The treatment effects are ρ, which measure the additional impact of active
(passive) transparency on a subsample where all observations had already been exposed to passive
(active) transparency. This baseline treatment is included in each α intercept. The remaining terms
are similar to equation (3.1), i.e. the interaction of time trends and treatments and the matrix of
municipal covariates.6
3.5.1 Constructing the Control Group For the Governance Experiment
Since CGU conducted random evaluations of both transparency programs, it is relatively easy
to construct the treated samples in this study. I assign indicator variables for each treatment to all
municipalities evaluated by CGU. The municipalities selected for both programs form the joint
transparency group, and selection to a single program forms each independent transparency group.
For the main governance experiment, however, I still lack a control group, formed by unaudited
municipalities before the implementation of FOI. I thus artificially construct a control group by
sampling municipalities from the complement set of treated municipalities. There are 5,568
municipalities in Brazil, out of which 2,930 participated in either transparency program. The
complement sampling pool thus has 2,638 municipalities. For a five percent minimum detectable
effect size, 90 percent power, and two-tail five percent significance level, the target sample size is
6For the corruption experiment, I center the time trends at 2012 because that is when FOI came into force in Brazil.
For all other experiments, time trends begin in 2005, the first year in the data.
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4,203 units. I require a minimum of 1,273 units for the control group to meet the desired power and
detectable effect size. Therefore, I randomly sample 650 municipalities from each of three years of
the cross-section for which I can recover all three pre-2012 governance outcomes. This process yields
a control group of 1,363 unique municipalities (1,950 municipality-year pairs) for a sample of 4,316
unique observations (7,149 municipality-year pairs). This process guarantees randomization both at
the sample selection and treatment assignment stages while meeting power requirements above.
3.6 Results
3.6.1 Governance Experiment
I first present the results of the governance experiment in table 3.3. In the top row, I list all
three outcomes summarizing governance at the municipal level. For each outcome, I estimate two
models, including and excluding municipal controls. All models include time trends and their
interactions with treatments. The rows on the left-hand side correspond to each treatment condition.
There is no uniform effect of joint (active + passive) transparency on all governance outcomes.
Though it positively impacts the adoption or update of an urban development plan (MUDP) in
column 1, the inclusion of municipal covariates washes away this effect in column 2. In addition,
there is no statistically significant effect of joint transparency on the number of sanctions imposed
on public officials across Brazilian municipalities (columns 5 and 6). The most interesting result,
however, is the improvement in the municipal human development index (HDI) (columns 3 and 4).
Joint transparency increases HDI by 10.7 percentage points in the preferred specification in column
4, which includes municipal covariates. To put this in perspective, such a gain in the country-wide
HDI would move Brazil up by 36 positions in the United Nation’s HDI (from 72th to 36th place).
This result confirms hypothesis HAP. Since no other study has investigated the joint effect of
transparency on social outcomes, this result should serve as a benchmark for future work in the
transparency literature.
Next, I investigate the effect of active transparency (audits) on governance outcomes.
Surprisingly, the only positive effect of active transparency is on MUDP adoption (the coefficient is
significant in both models including and excluding municipal covariates). Municipalities that have
been under audit before the implementation of FOI are 15.1 percentage points more likely to adopt,
or update, their MUDP (column 2). In section 3.3.1, I had posited that the effect of active
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transparency would be positive on all governance outcomes (HA1). The mechanism behind HA1
would be the reduction in corruption levels, which would positively contribute to improvement of
social outcomes (Ferraz et al. (2012) show a reduction in primary school students’ test scores) and
the application of sanctions on public officials (Avis et al. (2018) show an increase in sanctions when
Brazilian municipal governments are audited repeated times). Differences in research design and
timing might explain the opposite result here: Ferraz et al. (2012) only use pre-FOI data and Avis
et al. (2018) use all municipalities which have experienced audits more than once. Here, repeated
audits are only included when the municipality has also received a dummy freedom of information
request, in which case it is included in the joint treatment condition, or if the repeated audit
occurred before 2012 and thus the municipality is only included in the active treatment condition.
While this is a necessary condition for the composition of the two-treatment design, it unfortunately
reduces my ability to directly compare the results to Avis et al. (2018) because I drop from the
sample municipalities that were audited more than once if they do not need the above criteria.
Finally, I investigate the effects of passive transparency on governance outcomes. The effect of
passive transparency on HDI and the imposition of sanctions is positive and significant (columns
3-6). This result is contrary to hypotheses HP1, according to which I suggested that passive
transparency would have a negative impact on governance. It does not seem that municipal officials
are conforming to suboptimal performance nor that structuring government information interferes
with municipalities’ core activities. In fact, passive transparency might also help law enforcement
obtain court evidence against government officials – which is likely the mechanism behind the
28.5-percentage point increase in the probability of having at least one public official sanctioned by
authorities (column 6). The evidence here is particularly important because it supplements the
passive transparency literature in two ways: (1) it investigates FOI implementation at the local
level, rather than at the state or cross-country level, in (2) a context of multiple transparency
programs, which is a common policy strategy in various countries.
3.6.2 Corruption Experiment
The second quasi -experiment analyzes the effects of FOI on corruption. I look at the subsample
of audited municipalities, whose audit reports I use for constructing corruption outcomes, split at
the implementation of FOI (before and after 2012). This design is summarized in figure 3.2(b).
Since municipalities were randomly selected for audit, I am confident that the outcomes are not
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biased and the sample is representative of all municipalities in Brazil. Similarly, the mandatory,
nationwide implementation of FOI makes it independent from municipal characteristics, lending
additional support to the causal estimate produced here.
The results are presented and table 3.4. The order of outcomes, and model specifications, are
the same as in the governance experiment table – three outcomes on the top row and the treatment
of interest as the main variable on the left-hand side of the table. I first point out to the null effect
on acts of mismanagement. The adoption of FOI does not increase the non-criminal irregularities
carried out by public officials. The number of irregularities goes up, as it can be seen in columns 5
and 6, but these effects are entirely driven by corruption irregularities. The causal estimate of FOI
on acts of corruption is negative 22.3 percentage points (column 4). This result is contrary to
hypothesis HP2, where I had posited that the adoption of FOI would result in more corruption.
Besides the reasons in section 3.3.2 (bureaucrat conformity and time spent on structuring
information rather on core government activities), Cordis and Warren (2014) also suggest observing
more corruption because more corruption is detected – not because it has gone up after FOI. They
disentangle actual corruption and detection effects and document an improvement on both
outcomes. This study does not face the same problems, however. The probability of detecting
corruption remains relatively stable over the duration of the randomized audit program. CGU
selected between 120 and 180 audit municipalities, over a total of 5,568, every year the program ran.
As such, I can isolate corruption levels from detection levels and supplement Cordis and Warren
(2014) by leveraging more disaggregated evidence (local governments) and confirming that
transparency has a positive effect across contexts (both in developed and developing countries).
These results are also relevant because they consolidate the use of objective measures of corruption
in FOI analyses (along with Cordis and Warren, 2014), in opposition to earlier passive transparency
studies (Escaleras et al., 2010; Costa, 2013).
3.6.3 Information Experiment
I lastly investigate whether active transparency has positive effects on FOI compliance. The
mechanism behind hypothesis HA2 is the positive effect audit officials have on local administrators.
Not only would they positively affect the work of local officials because of their higher skills, but
they would also impact information systems. The data used in audit reports require cross-agency
effort and structuring these data for auditors would also make it easier to respond to FOI requests
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in the future.
To conduct this sub-experiment, I subset the original sample to only contain municipalities that
have been randomly selected to participate in CGU’s FOI evaluation program. Since both this and
the audit evaluation overlap in time, some of these municipalities have also been randomly selected
for auditing, creating an unbiased, counterfactual group of municipalities with an additional layer of
(active) transparency. This design is summarized in figure 3.2(a) and its results included in table 3.5.
The two FOI outcomes are the time and accuracy with which local officials respond to information
requests. I estimate linear probability models for both outcomes, so the logical interpretation of
active transparency coefficients is the effect on FOI compliance in percentage points bounded by one
(i.e., 100 percentage points). In all regressions, active transparency almost fully predicts FOI
compliance. The impact is a 96.3 and 100-percentage point increase for time and accuracy in my
preferred models (columns 2 and 4) when municipalities have been the target of audits in the past.
These results confirm hypothesis HA2, and are the first evidence that audits, as a mechanism of
top-down government monitoring, improve information released by government. Thus, beyond their
impact in reducing corruption, documented in Olken (2007), Ferraz and Finan (2008), Bobonis et al.
(2016), and others, audits would also improve FOI compliance and the quality of government
information passively released to the public.
However, I am skeptical about the large magnitude of the effect in both models. Unless we
believe that local officials are going to absorb all knowledge from federal auditors in two weeks,
which is the time they spent in town reviewing documents for audit reports, there seems to be
something else going on that is driving this result. A possible explanation comes from the structure
of audits and the measurement of FOI compliance. Both audits and the evaluation program7
focused on the same three areas: health, education, and social services. Thus, I could be picking up
improvements in FOI compliance only for these areas, but that would not be true for other policy
areas. A second explanation comes from the nature of the programs under evaluation. Since CGU
has oversight of federal funds, even when these are transferred over to municipalities, it mainly
7In addition to these areas, the FOI randomized evaluation program also obtained information about FOI
implementation.
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focuses on evaluating federal programs – which are precisely the programs with the best records and
information management systems. Audits are more likely to have an effect on these programs
because they are more easily managed and, if need be, adjusted to comply with federal regulation.
FOI compliance on local, less structured programs would be harder to deliver. For these reasons, I
do not believe an unbiased causal effect is warranted in this experiment. Nevertheless, in the
absence of scientific evidence on the relationship between audits and FOI compliance, the
association uncovered in this experiment is still relevant for understanding how audits impact other
government policies.
3.6.4 Evolution of Transparency Effects Over Time
Besides the immediate effect of the implementation of transparency policies, policymakers
would also like to know the effect of transparency over time. I am thus interested in projecting
transparency gains into the future after either policy (or both) is (are) adopted. The reasoning is
straightforward. The positive impact of more transparency in government affairs might be large at
first but then level off as officials adjust to the new environment. Cordis and Warren (2014)
document this attenuation of FOI effects over time.
I calculate these effects using the time trends and their interactions with treatments. For the
main results in each experiment, I compare the cumulative improvement in outcomes for either
group (treatment and control) and their difference in figures 3.3 – 3.5. I only use the statistically
significant parameters, which means that projected gains could be constant, linear, or display
(decreasing) increasing returns to scale conditional on the significance of parameters in each
regression. The analysis spans over a period of six years after 2012, which is when FOI is
implemented. In figure 3.3, panels (a) and (b) show the cumulative effect of each transparency
policy on the probability of adoption or update of an urban development plan. In either case, the
initial percentage point gain for the treatment group levels off at year four, around the
45-percentage point mark. By year six, all municipalities are predicted to have passed a new MUDP
as they their estimated cumulate gain in probability is greater than one. It means that the
transparency gain in performance is short-lived. Control municipalities are expected to catch up as
a result of changes in policies other than increased transparency.
In figure 3.4(a), I look at the effect of joint transparency on HDI. The projected gain in human
development index is increasing for all six years under analysis. Though returns are decreasing in
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scale, control municipalities do not catch up in the short-term. This is a particularly interesting
result as it demonstrates the relative importance of transparency programs to improve social
outcomes. In this study, I am not accounting for other factors that would prevent the uninterrupted
increase in HDI, so we should be careful in interpreting such effect. We can additionally compare
the gains of joint versus single transparency programs by looking at figure 3.4(b). Passive
transparency cumulative gains, when discounted by improvement trends shared with the control
group, yield no more than a 10-percentage point increase against baseline HDI – the blue line in
figure 3.4(b). This is a particularly interesting result: both control and passive transparency
municipalities lag behind the joint transparency municipalities. Therefore, besides documenting the
positive effect of double transparency on development, I also project that this effect persists for at
least six years after these policies’ have been implemented.
Lastly, I present the results for the corruption (panel (a)) and information (panel (b))
sub-experiments in figure 3.5. I investigate the cross-effects of audit (FOI) on information
compliance (corruption). In panel (a), the time trends and their interactions are not significant,
yielding the constant effect of FOI over time (hence the treatment and difference trends overlap).
This result seems reasonable if we believe that once FOI has been implemented, there is a baseline
level of corruption which is inevitably detectable but FOI is ineffective beyond that point. I would
imagine, however, that officials would adjust to the new regulation and we should see fewer acts of
corruption, either because they have adjusted to a lower level of wrongdoing or they are better at
hiding it. If this is the case instead, we should see a decrease in FOI’s ability to detect baseline
corruption. I keep these alternative explanations open as future avenues of research. In panel (b),
there is a large difference in the cumulative effect for treatment and control groups, but these
differences are nonsensical. FOI outcomes are measured on a zero to one scale such that any
projection greater than one is meaningless in actuality. Audited municipalities meet information
reporting standards by year one and control municipalities reach reporting standards by year five
just as a result of overall changes in local governments over time. The takeaway here is that audits
should not be implemented if a government’s goal is to improve FOI compliance.
3.7 Conclusion
In this study, I explore a unique institutional setting in Brazil and identify the effects of active
and passive transparency on local governance. The Brazilian government implemented two policies
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(randomized audits and the nationwide enactment of Brazil’s FOI) during the same time period and
they both positively shocked transparency; this setting thus forms a unique opportunity to study
transparency initiatives that, until now, had been analyzed separately. I find that double
transparency improves social outcomes, as measured by the municipal human development index,
but has no impact on government performance nor sanctions applied to local officials.
To my knowledge, this study is the first attempt at measuring the simultaneous effects of
transparency on governance. Since transparency policies are rarely implemented in isolation, there is
a clear policy implication of this study: (a) adopting active and passive transparency policies would
be best for improving social outcomes above and beyond either active or passive transparency, but
(b) double transparency would not result in more sanctions applied to public officials when
compared to any single transparency initiative. I also project transparency gains into the future to
indicate how best and more quickly governments can improve governance. In fact, control
municipalities cannot catch up with treated municipalities in their human development scores within
the first six years of treatment by just relying on other policies (control municipalities catch up only
in their performance scores).
Supplemental to the main results, I also investigate the cross-effects of FOI on corruption and
audits on information quality. I contribute evidence on the relationship between FOI and corruption
(a) at the local level and (b) in a development context. I find that the enactment of FOI in Brazil
reduces municipal corruption by 22.3 percent. I also show that having being the subject of a federal
audit is almost perfectly correlated with FOI compliance. Though I believe the direction and
significance of this relationship are accurate, I cannot confidently claim that the magnitude of the
effect fully reflects a causal impact of audits on information outcomes. In addition, control
municipalities can quickly catch up with treated municipalities by making changes in policies other
than transparency.
The limitations of this project are twofold. First, I unfortunately do not observe corruption and
information outcomes for all municipalities in the sample. I take advantage of two programs that
randomly measure outcomes and that, despite unbiased, are not available for municipalities that
have not been selected to participate in the evaluation stages. Second, this is not, in reality, an
experimental study; though I treat for potential unobservable heterogeneity and control for
observable differences across units, I cannot entirely rule out potentially confounding effects which
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occur simultaneously during the period under study. Yet, this study fills in important gaps in the
transparency literature: it is the first project jointly investigating active and passive transparency, it
overcomes the lack of causal identification or within-country analysis in previous studies, and
provides evidence for yet unexplored transparency impacts on relevant governance, economic, and
social development outcomes.
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3.8 Tables and Figures
















Note: The first number in squared brackets is the total
number of observations in each group; the second number
is the number of unique observations in each group.
Table 3.1: Expected Effects of Treatments on Outcomes





1. Performance, Development, Sanctions ? (HAP) + (HA1) − (HP1)
2. FOI compliance + (HA2)
3. Corruption − (HP2)










Mean Diff. p-value Mean Diff. p-value Mean Diff. p-value
Share Urban (Pop.) .626 −.008 .585 .627 −.005 .743 .636 .005 .771
Share Female (Pop.) .506 .001 .699 .505 .000 .895 .505 .001 .556
Share Illiterate .183 .009 .174 .179 .007 .342 .168 −.004 .549
Income Per Capita (ln) 9.044 −.105∗∗ .021 9.052 −.113∗∗ .017 9.167 .002 .960
Gini Coefficient .508 .000 .986 .512 −.004 .364 .510 −.006 .186
Share Poor (Pop.) .265 .010 .412 .269 .003 .787 .246 −.020 .138
Presence of AM Radio .190 −.011 .685 .201 −.009 .750 .212 .002 .945
Presence of Health Council .787 .012 .667 .760 .032 .274 .760 .032 .299
Presence of Education Council .958 −.010 .462 .970 −.009 .513 .972 −.007 .630









Governance Experiment Yes Yes Yes
Information Experiment Yes Yes -
Corruption Experiment Yes - Yes
Note: This table displays means for all covariates for observations in each treatment condition (column
1 in each group). Column 2 is the mean difference between observations in the treatment group vs. each
control group. For the active and passive transparency intervention, the control group is composed of
unaudited municipalities before 2012 (n = 1,363); for the active transparency intervention, the control
group are unaudited municipalities after 2012 (n = 1,816); for the passive transparency intervention, the
control group are the audited municipalities before 2012 (n = 897). Column 3 displays the p-values from
t-tests performed on these variables across samples.
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(a) Information Experiment (b) Corruption Experiment
Note: In square brackets, I respectively report the total number of observations (municipality-year pair) and
the number of unique municipalities in each group.









(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Active + Passive Transparency .419∗ .323 .093∗ .107∗∗∗ −.121 −.133
(.241) (.246) (.048) (.033) (.103) (.119)
Active Transparency .130∗∗∗ .151∗∗∗ −.044∗∗∗ −.009 −.015 −.017
(.033) (.036) (.009) (.006) (.012) (.017)
Passive Transparency .143 .207∗∗ .073∗∗∗ .037∗∗∗ .278∗∗∗ .285∗∗∗
(.141) (.091) (.028) (.013) (.068) (.078)
Time Trend Interactions Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipal Controls - Yes - Yes - Yes
Observations 7,149 7,149 7,149 7,149 7,149 7,149
F -stat 44.9∗∗∗ 156.3∗∗∗ 107.2∗∗∗ 1037.6∗∗∗ 7.5∗∗∗ 29.1∗∗∗
Note: The regressions here estimate the effect of each transparency condition on three municipal out-
comes: whether the administration adopts an urban development plan, their human development score,
and whether the mayor or anyone in their team has been sanctioned by law enforcement authorities.
Columns 1, 3, and 5 estimate the models without covariates. Columns 2, 4, and 6 include municipal
covariates and time trends interactions to control for observable differences across municipalities that
could simultaneously explain the outcomes. All standard errors are clustered at the municipality level.
A municipality could have been audited or sampled to form the artificial control group more than once,
thus the sample size (7,149) is larger than the number of unique municipalities in the study (4,316).
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Passive Transparency .114 .104 −.228∗∗∗ −.223∗∗∗ −.218∗∗∗ −.215∗∗∗
(.092) (.116) (.058) (.062) (.054) (.060)
Time Trend Interactions Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipal Controls - Yes - Yes - Yes
Observations 1,686 1,686 1,686 1,686 1,686 1,686
F -stat 38.7∗∗∗ 10.5∗∗∗ 10.1∗∗∗ 43.1∗∗∗ 8.7∗∗∗ 36.4∗∗∗
Note: The regressions here estimate the effect of passive transparency (FOI laws implemented
across Brazil) on three corruption outcomes: whether the municipal administration has mis-
manage public funds, engaged in corruption, and the number of violations to sound spending
according to federal law. Columns 1, 3, and 5 estimate the models without covariates. Columns
2, 4, and 6 include municipal covariates and time trends interactions to control for observable
differences across municipalities that could simultaneously explain the outcomes. All standard
errors are clustered at the municipality level. A municipality could have been audited more than
once, thus the sample size (1,686) is larger than the number of unique municipalities in the study
(1,114). ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.







(1) (2) (3) (4)
Active Transparency .943∗∗∗ .963∗∗∗ 1.100∗∗∗ 1.117∗∗∗
(.146) (.150) (.146) (.151)
Time Trend Interactions Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipal Controls - Yes - Yes
Observations 3,879 3,879 3,879 3,879
F -stat 45.0∗∗∗ 47.5∗∗∗ 55.1∗∗∗ 47.5∗∗∗
Note: The regressions here estimate the effect of active transparency
(random audits of public spending) on two FOI outcomes: the proba-
bility of the municipal administration responding to FOI requests in
timely and accurately manner. Columns 1 and 3 estimate the models
without covariates. Columns 2 and 4 include municipal covariates and
time trend interactions to control for observable differences across mu-
nicipalities that could simultaneously explain the outcomes. All stan-
dard errors are clustered at the municipality level. The information
outcomes were collected in three waves, for the same municipalities,
so the sample size (3,879) is larger than the number of unique munic-
ipalities in the study (2,033). ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
90
Figure 3.3: Performance Improvement Trends
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Figure 3.4: Development Improvement Trends
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Figure 3.5: Corruption and Information Improvement Trends
(a) Corruption Experiment:
Passive Transparency vs. Control Group
(b) Information Experiment:
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Electoral Crime Under Democracy: Information Effects from Judicial Decisions
in Brazil
A.1 Voter Information Channels
Though I do not directly observe voters acquiring criminal information about politicians, I
present indirect evidence supporting two main information channels: (i) the media and (ii) other
candidates. Boas and Hidalgo (2011) show evidence in favor of (i). They investigate how politicians
who control local radio stations perform in municipal elections and show both that the radio is
instrumental to successful political campaigns and that individuals who control such radios perform
better in local elections. It is not uncommon for radio hosts to invite candidates to debate platforms
on live radio or to openly support a particular candidate, including when this means attacking
others. For example, in the lead-up to the 2012 municipal elections, the electoral judge of Pacajus,
in the State of Ceará, blocked a radio show from airing because the radio host, the father of the
incumbent mayor, had been raising false claims against other mayor candidates in his show. It
illustrates how criminal behavior, or allegations thereof, are covered in the local media. To further
indicate the interest of voters in politicians’ criminal records, I present a measure of interest in the
Clean Records Act of 2010 during electoral cycles. Besides verifying candidates’ criminal records,
the Act was approved in response to popular demand such that voters recognize it when browsing
the internet, reading the news, watching the TV, or listening to the radio. In figure figure A.1, I
plot Google Web Searches in Brazil on two search terms: the “Clean Records Act of 2010” and
“Municipal Elections.” On the y-axis, I report search interest relative to peak of the two terms –
June 2010, when the Clean Records Act was enacted into law. The first thing we notice is the spike
in search interest on the Act (black line) every two years, when elections occur. The dashed vertical
lines indicate federal and municipal election months, respectively in red and blue. Indicating the
relative importance of these searches, the interest for municipal elections (grey line) is similar and
also spikes every election, as expected. Though not conclusive, these facts indicate that (1) the
media is a mechanism of information acquisition for voters and that (2) there is enough interest in
criminal records such that the media would air such stories.
A built-in feature of the electoral system, the second channel is direct candidate-voter
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communication during elections. The Electoral Code of 1965 establishes that TV and Radio stations
across the country should air campaign advertisements free of charge, Monday through Friday,
starting 45 days before every election. Every week day, ads run for two 25-minute blocks, at lunch
time and evening prime time, and short 1-minute clips, capped at 30 minutes per day. A third of
airtime is split evenly across all candidates and two-thirds follow the share of seats each coalition
holds in Congress at the time of elections. These ads serve as a platform for politicians to
communicate directly with voters and discuss both their strengths and the weaknesses of their
opponents. In fact, there are provisions in the law for granting candidates the right to respond to
attacks during their opponents’ air time. Though we do not observe ad content, we can reasonably
expect candidates will target and make public legal disputes in which their opponents are involved.
As evidence of the importance of these campaign ads, Da Silveira and De Mello (2011) show that an
increase in air time is positively correlated with electoral performance in gubernatorial and mayor
races. We can thus safely assume that the built-in provisions and the relative importance of these
ads indicate how else voters learn about their preferred candidate’s criminal records.



































Search Term: Clean Records Act Municipal Elections
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A.2 Electoral Ruling Classification
The Brazilian Electoral Court (TSE) is responsible for authorizing individual candidacies for
elected office. Every cycle, all candidates submit proper documentation to the court, ahead of
elections, and the court authorizes or dismisses candidacies based on statutory electoral law. I
discuss this mechanism at length in section 1.3. These decisions are actual judicial sentences issued
by judges at trial and appellate (electoral) courts. These sentences are public documents, and are
available both on paper at electoral district courtrooms across the country or as electronic
documents on the TSE’s website. I use these data in this project. Due to TSE’s online database
management limitations, however, I can only recover sentences for some candidates in my sample.
There is no reason to believe there is any selection bias in the disclosure of these documents: almost
no sentences are available for the 2004 and 2008 elections, but all sentences are available for the 2012
and 2016 elections, indicating an information technology, rather than a political favoritism, issue.
To conduct the heterogeneous effect analysis in section 1.9, I classify these sentences into severe
or trivial rule-breaking according to electoral law in Brazil. There are eight reasons preventing
candidates from running for office: (1) individual documentation is incomplete: candidates have
not included their social security numbers, identification card numbers, photos, or other information
in candidacy applications; (2) party documentation is incomplete: parties might have not presented
financial records, or coalition did not meet legal requirements; (3) candidacy impeachment: the
electoral prosecutor or private parties (opponents, political parties) filed, and were granted, a request
for impeachment based on violations to electoral law; (4) use of public office for electoral gain:
public officials have used their office for direct benefit (when they are on the ticket) or indirect
benefit (when they do it to support someone else, usually a political ally);
(5) illegal campaign spending: candidates have used funds for activities forbidden by electoral law
or have spent beyond spending limits; (6) vote buying: candidates have paid, in cash or in kind,
individuals in exchange for their votes; (7) abuse of economic power: candidates channelled
campaign spending via private parties, usually business executives who support candidates and
campaign on their behalf; (8) previous criminal convictions: candidates had been convicted at trial,
and their conviction was affirmed on appeals, for crimes in the past (corruption, murder, abuse of
power, and others). Reasons 1 and 2 are classified as trivial rule-breaking, since they are related to
procedural reasons for dismissal of candidacies. Individuals or parties could have easily fixed those
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by submitting or keeping proper documentation. All other reasons are instances of severe electoral
violations; candidates actively engaged in illegal actions either before or when running for public
office. All of these regulations are codified in electoral legislation summarized throughout the paper.
Importantly, TSE created these categories and has been publishing individual-level information
for rejections since 2014. I use these categories as classes, and words in each sentence as features, for
training machine classification algorithms. First, I group categories 1 and 2 as trivial rule-breaking,
and categories 3-8 as severe rule-breaking. The imbalance in the classes justifies such approach:
some categories make up less than one percent of the sample, thus the algorithm would not
meaningfully predict them on such a small set of observations. Second, classes 3-8 are based on the
Clean Records Act of 2010 and the Law of Elections of 1997; their provisions and punishment are
relatively standard, making individual violations less relevant for criminal decisions. Individuals are
usually indicted on multiple counts of breach of both statutes, therefore the relevant break in
behavior occurs between trivial and non-trivial actions. After this process, the ratio of classes is
80-20 for procedural and severe electoral violations.
The features used for classification come from each judicial sentence available on the TSE’s
website, which is almost exclusively composed of sentences in 2012 and 2016 (over 99 percent of all
sample). I process the text in each sentence by eliminating stopwords and computing the count and
term frequency-inverse document frequency (TF-IDF) for every unigram and bigram appearing
more than five times in all sentences. The final dataset contains more than 278,992 features
(variables) and 57,478 sentences (rows). Candidates can have multiple sentences if they appealed
their cases to higher courts. Using these data, I train six algorithms on 80 percent of 2016 data and
test on a 20 percent hold-out to predict 2012 classes. The classification algorithms are: Multinomial
Naive Bayes Classifier (NB), Logistic Regression, Linear Support-Vector Classification (Linear SVC),
Random Forest, Adaptive Boosting, and Gradient Boosting. I compute their accuracy scores and
area under the curve (AUC), and implement five-fold cross validation at training. Figure A.2
displays mean accuracy across validation folds. I also report the mean area under the curve across
validation folds in panel A of table A.1. I also run a Deep Neural Networks model that uses
300-dimension word vectors for each of the 16,396 unique words, but I omit such model here because
it performs much than the others (85 percent accuracy). The best classification algorithm is the
Linear SVC model, with an average of 93 percent accuracy across training folds and .98 area under
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the curve (AUC). In panel B of table A.1, I report the hold-out classification results, and the best
performing model is also Linear SVC, with 88 percent accuracy and .731 area under the curve.
Therefore, I use such model to predict the reasons for convicting candidates in 2012. These
predictions then become the heterogeneous treatment variable in section 1.9, which break down the
conviction effect into two types: conviction for severe or trivial electoral crimes.
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Cross-Validation Accuracy
Validation Stage Test Train
Table A.1: Validation Accuracy and AUC Scores
Panel A: 5-fold Cross-Validation Sample Panel B: Hold-Out Sample
Model Accuracy AUC Model Accuracy AUC
(mean) (mean)
1. Linear SVC 0.930 0.980 1. Linear SVC 0.880 0.731
2. Logistic Regression 0.892 0.953 2. Random Forest 0.879 0.714
3. Multinomial NB 0.852 0.925 3. Logistic Regression 0.859 0.706
4. Gradient Boosting 0.802 0.894 4. Multinomial NB 0.842 0.690
5. Adaptive Boosting 0.747 0.849 5. Gradient Boosting 0.841 0.666
6. Random Forest 0.617 0.789 6. Adaptive Boosting 0.788 0.628
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APPENDIX B
Judicial Favoritism of Politicans: Evidence from Small Claims Courts
B.1 List of SCT Case Types in Brazil
This is a non-exhaustive, summarized list of disputes settled in SCTs:
1. Breach of Contract.
2. Claim and Delivery.
3. Consumer Rights.
4. Contractual Obligations.
5. Debt Collection and Execution.
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